Apologetics Lane

Friday, June 13, 2014

William Lane Craig Apologetics Sampler

Belief in God as Properly Basic - William Lane Craig
http://www.gospelcrumbs.blogspot.com/2013/09/christian-apologetics-who-needs-it-by.html#properly_basic

Kalam Cosmological Argument - Part 1 - William Lane Craig
http://youtu.be/yGWuZ0h4DN8

Teleological Argument - Part 1 - William Lane Craig
http://youtu.be/1PKQDLgFVS4

Contingency Argument for God - Part 1 - William Lane Craig
http://youtu.be/Es7VcL6SuwE

The Ontological Argument - Part 1 - William Lane Craig
http://youtu.be/D1-ySbzmrEI

Moral Argument For God - Part 1 - William Lane Craig
http://youtu.be/mj2BeUP52Dc

Divine Hiddenness - William Lane Craig
http://youtu.be/d8EZBX8ZbWQ

The Euthyphro Dilemma - William Lane Craig
http://youtu.be/wBvi_auKkaI

Thursday, June 12, 2014

Definitions of Chance

The word and concept(s) of "chance" is something that often crops up in apologetical, theological and philosophical discussions. For example, discussions regarding evolution, intelligent design, predestination, free will, providence, superstition, mythology, quantum mechanics etc. Unfortunately, the word is often used imprecisely and equivocally. That's because the word "chance" can refer to different concepts and their different meanings are used interchangeably in discussions (often resulting in the fallacy of equivocation).

So, for the sake of clearer and more productive discussions, here are some rough and ready definitions.

Chance is one of those words that has different meanings in different contexts. Here are SEVEN common ways the term is used (there are probably many more).

1. Chance can refer to our ignorance due to (seemingly) random events (to finite minds). For example, we talk about how a flipped coin ends up landing heads or tails "because of" chance (or "by chance"). "Chance" here has no metaphysical existence. It's a description of or reference to our ignorance of the conditions of a certain situation. In flipping a coin we never know the exact amount of spin given to the coin, the distance to the floor, the height of flipping, how air pressure/wind/humidity (etc) affects the flipping and landing of the coin. The same goes for randomly shuffled cards. There's only a limited number of ways in which they can be arranged. Even if we can't predict which way because of limited knowledge or limited mental calculating ability. The key word is "ignorance."

2. Related to the above, "chance" can refer to randomness. For example, after randomly shuffling cards we might say that whatever card ends up being on top was a result of or "by chance". The key words is "randomness."

3. "Chance" can refer to mathematical probabilities. For example, when we speak about the "chances" of a coin landing heads or tales being 50/50. The statistical probability does not affect the outcome even though some people might think that it does or can.

4. "Chance" sometimes refers to an interesting coincidence. For example, you can try to call someone at the same time he is attempting to call you. As a result both of you may talk about how it was "by chance" you both decided to call each other. Or how "by chance" you met each other at the dentist's office even though neither of you had planned on it. This usage is related to the concept of serendipity. Which Wikipedia defines as a '"fortuitous happenstance" or "pleasant surprise".'

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Serendipity

5. "Chance" can refer to metaphysically contingent events (including "freak events"). That is, events that have no metaphysical and/or epistemic (rational) cause or reason. For example, if a horse were to pop into existence instantaneously without any physical or metaphysical cause. Christians reject metaphysically contingent events because of our doctrine of providence.

6. "Chance" can refer to something that actually has power to do something. "Chance" in this case is a power or entity that can determine things (sometimes called luck, fortune, destiny etc). As if it has some metaphysical existence of its own and power or force to affect events in reality. So for example, some people attribute their meeting and finding their spouse to "chance" in the same way others would refer to fate, destiny or fortune. Another example is how people talk about "Lady Luck" when it comes to gambling or a winning streak. Christians reject this superstitious notion of "chance." However, Christians do believe in providentially appointed events.

7. "Chance" can sometimes be associated with the Three Fates of mythology (cf. Moirai or Parcae).

As noted above, these different senses of the word "chance" is often mixed up, confounded and muddled in conversation. Both between different people and when a single person is speaking about a particular topic. The first four senses are compatible with Christianity, but the last three are incompatible with Christianity.

Here's an EXCELLENT book on the topic of Chance and God's Sovereignty by Vern Poythress. Amazingly it's freely available online!!!!!!!

Chance and the Sovereignty of God: A God-Centered Approach to Probability and Random Events (PDF) by Vern Poythress.

Related Blogs:

Three Kinds of Providence

Distinctions in God's Will from a Calvinist Perspective [ My Five Distinctions]

On the Accuracy of Luke's Census

A well known apparent error in the Bible that skeptics have often pointed out is the issue of the historicity of Luke's record of a census while Quirinius was governor of Syria (Luke 2:1-2).

The following are some links to resources that will help Christians deal with the problem.

The Census of Quirinius
https://youtu.be/VclDxog95Ck

Did Luke Misdate the Census of Quirinius?
https://youtu.be/wVR0jXxJDn0

Some Triablogue links:

Other links:

Once More: Quirinius's Census by Jared M. Compton
http://www.biblearchaeology.org/post/2009/11/01/Once-More-Quiriniuss-Census.aspx

On Quirinius' Census by Darrell Bock
www.youtube.com/watch?v=qWm0O93unDY&feature=related

Josephus Misdated the Census of Quirinius by John H. Rhoads
http://www.etsjets.org/files/JETS-PDFs/54/54-1/JETS_54-1_65-87_Rhoads.pdf

Luke, Quirinius, and the Census by Dave Miller, Ph.D.
http://www.apologeticspress.org/apcontent.aspx?category=6&article=907&utm_source=buffer&buffer_share=05f5f

Luke 2:2 and the Census by Stephen C. Carlson
http://hypotyposeis.org/weblog/2004/12/luke-22-and-the-census.html

A “most prominent” census: Carlson vs. Carrier

Luke, Quirinius, and the Census
http://apologeticspress.org/apcontent.aspx?category=6&article=907

Unbelievable? Is Luke’s Description of Quirinius Historically Inaccurate?
http://coldcasechristianity.com/2017/unbelievable-is-lukes-description-of-quirinius-historically-inaccurate/

Controversial researcher Ernest L. Martin addressed the census in his book The Star of Bethlehem: The Star That Astonished the World.
Here's a link to Chapter 12

While I'm no longer a Roman Catholic, Catholic apologist Robert Sungenis wrote:

"Thanks to the work of Hugues de Nanteuil, we have found that the modern critics are wrong. Little known (or advertised by modern scholars) is that Josephus had two different dates for the death of Herod, and the interpretation of the source containing 4 B.C. is highly debatable. In Herod’s [sic] other work, he says Herod died in 7 or 8 BC."

If it's true that Josephus had two different dates for the death of Herod, then it would be a matter of fact that Josephus got it wrong at least once. Which also means Josephus could have gotten it wrong twice. Conversely, this also means that Luke could have gotten it right. In which case, skeptics put too much weight on this apparent Biblical error whenever they argue against Biblical Inerrancy. Unfortunately, Sungenis didn't give any more information in his reference to the work of Hugues de Nanteuil.

Michael Heiser lists some recent scholarly reasons why Herod may have died 1 BCE in an article here: http://drmsh.com/september-11-happy-birthday-to-jesus/

Heiser's two main sources in defense of a 1 BCE death of Herod are:

1. Herodian Chronology by Ormond Edwards,
from the Palestine Exploration Quarterly, volume 114, 1982 - Issue 1

2. When Did Herod the Great Reign? by Andrew E. Steinmann,
from Novum Testamentum 51 (2009) 1-29

Wednesday, June 4, 2014

Does the New Testament Quote the Old Testament Out of Context?

Does the New Testament Quote the Old Testament Out of Context? by Craig Keener

See also Steve Hays interaction in the comments section of his blog HERE. Steve does a great job explaining how the New Testament authors legitimately quoted the Old Testament.

I also wrote the following comments in Steve's blog:

This might help or hurt. According to some Messianic Jews there are:

Four categories of quotations in the New Testment of the Old Testament. Using a common Jewish hermeneutical approach called Pardes/PaRDeS.

Arnold Fruchtenbaum argues [in his article How the New Testament Quotes the Old Testament] the following four ways.

*P*ardes
Literal Prophecy Plus Literal Fulfillment: Pshat
The first category is known as “literal prophecy plus literal fulfillment,” reflecting the rabbinic pshat, which refers to the simple meaning of the text. The example of this first category is found in Matthew 2:5 6.

pa*R*des
Literal Plus Typical: Remez
The second category of quotations can be labeled “literal plus typical.” In rabbinic theology it was known are remez or “hint.” An example of this category is found in Matthew 2:15.

par*D*es
Literal Plus Application: Drash
The third category is “literal plus application,” correlating with the rabbinic drash. The example of this category is Matthew 2:17 18.

parde*S*
Summation: Sod
The fourth category is “summation” or “summary.” The meaning of sod is “secret” or “mystery” or “something unknown.” The example of the fourth category is found in Matthew 2:23.

(cf. this article A Look at Messianic Prophecy: Four Ways the New Testament Authors Use the Hebrew Bible )

Typology And Simplistic Skepticism by Steve Hays

The Nature Of Biblical Prophecy Fulfillment by Jason Engwer

I would also recommend Michael L. Brown's five volume work Answering Jewish Objections to Jesus. Since I possess all five volumes, I can definitely say that Brown answers all the major objections to Jesus as the prophesied Messiah in the Old Testament. See also my related blog:

What Do You Think About The Messiah?

Isa. 7:14, Matt. 1:23 and the Virgin Birth
http://bibledifficultiesanswered.blogspot.com/2015/06/isa-714-matt-123-and-virgin-birth.html

More Links:

How the New Testament Quotes the Old Testament by Arnold Fruchtenbaum

Here is a link to Arnold Fruchtenbaum's 21 part lecture series on The Life of the Messiah (now titled "The Jewish Life of Christ")

Fruchtenbaum explains PaRDeS in audio lecture #3.

Lecture 1	Lecture 2	Lecture 3	Lecture 4	Lecture 5	Lecture 6	Lecture 7
Lecture 8	Lecture 9	Lecture 10	Lecture 11	Lecture 12	Lecture 13	Lecture 14
Lecture 15	Lecture 16	Lecture 17	Lecture 18	Lecture 19	Lecture 20	Lecture 21

A Look at Messianic Prophecy: Four Ways the New Testament Authors Use the Hebrew Bible

Does the New Testament misquote the Old Testament?

by Robert Plummer

https://youtu.be/c2I6KgoLSIs

Sunday, May 25, 2014

Archaeology and the Bible

Some interesting videos on Bibical archaeology.

Lecture by Dr. James Hoffmeier from Lanier Theological Library on Vimeo.

Lecture by Dr. James Hoffmeier
https://youtu.be/m2vhrK6Wczs

Lecture by Dr. Steven Collins -

Confirming the Bible Through Archaeology
https://youtu.be/hO8t-jDrF7E

Archaeology and the Historical Reliability of the New Testament by Peter S. Williams

11 Archaeological Finds for the Gospels (Dr. Titus Kennedy)
https://youtu.be/3vrKCMBdyq8

Monday, May 12, 2014

Closer to Truth Interviews of Special Interests to Christians

All of the interviews at Closer to Truth are both informative and fascinating. However, some should be of special interest to Christians since Closer to Truth is not a Christian website, and most of the interviews are of notable Non-Christians. If the links eventually die, here's the link to the main website: www.closertotruth.com
Most of the videos have longer and shorter versions.

Here is a sample of some of those interviews that should be of interest to Christians.

Robin Collins (Christian philosopher trained in physics)
http://www.closertotruth.com/contributor/robin-collins/profile

William Lane Craig (world renowned Christian philosopher, theologian and apologist)
http://www.closertotruth.com/contributor/william-craig/profile

Oliver Crisp (Christian theologian)
http://www.closertotruth.com/contributor/oliver-crisp/profile

William Dembski (Christian mathematician, philosopher and noted Intelligent Design proponent)|
http://www.closertotruth.com/contributor/william-dembski/profile

Thomas Flint (Catholic philosopher and noted propounder of Molinism)
http://www.closertotruth.com/contributor/thomas-flint/profile

David Hunt (the Christian philosopher not to be confused with Dave Hunt of The Berean Call ministry)
http://www.closertotruth.com/contributor/david-hunt/profile

J.P. Moreland (Christian philosopher)
http://www.closertotruth.com/contributor/jp-moreland/profile

Alvin Plantinga
http://www.closertotruth.com/contributor/alvin-plantinga/profile

Alister McGrath
http://www.closertotruth.com/contributor/alister-mcgrath/profile

Richard Swinburne
http://www.closertotruth.com/contributor/richard-swinburne/profile

John Polkinghorne
www.closertotruth.com/contributor/john-polkinghorne/profile

Francis S. Collins
http://www.closertotruth.com/contributor/francis-collins/profile

Francisco J. Ayala
http://www.closertotruth.com/contributor/francisco-ayala/profile

Peter Van Inwagen
http://www.closertotruth.com/contributor/peter-van-inwagen/profile

Frank J. Tipler
http://www.closertotruth.com/contributor/frank-tipler/profile

Robert L. Saucy
http://www.closertotruth.com/contributor/robert-saucy/profile

Brian Leftow
http://www.closertotruth.com/contributor/brian-leftow/profile

God in Relation to Law: Ex Lex, Sub Lego or Sibi Ipsi Lex

See also my blogpost: Why Obey God? as well as Distinctions in God's Will from a Calvinist Perspective

Quote:

In the Middle Ages, questions were raised about the propriety of thinking that the atonement of Jesus was made necessary by some abstract law of the universe that required God’s justice to be satisfied. This gave rise to the so-called Ex Lex debate. In the Ex Lex debate, the question was raised as to whether God’s will functioned apart from any law or outside of any law (ex lex), or whether the will of God was itself subjected to some norm of righteousness or cosmic law that God was required to follow and, therefore, His will was exercised under law (sub lego). The question was: Is God apart from law or is He under law?

The church’s response to this dilemma was to say basically “a pox on both houses,” and to declare that God is neither apart from law nor under law in these respective senses. Rather, the church responded by affirming that God is both apart from law and under law, in so far as He is free from any restraints imposed upon Him by some law that exists outside of Himself. In that sense, He is apart from law and not under law. Yet at the same time, God is not arbitrary or capricious and works according to the law of His own nature. The church declared that God is a law unto Himself. This reflects not a spirit of lawlessness within God, but that the norm for God’s behavior and God’s will is based on what the seventeenth-century orthodox theologians called “the natural law of God.”
- R.C. Sproul [source]

Philip Johnson wrote:

Anyway, I think John Frame's assessment of Clark's famous theodicy is helpful. Here it is. Frame's own footnotes are included in braces {and faint type}:

[Clark's] argument is that God is ex lex, which means "outside of the law." The idea is that God is outside of or above the laws he prescribes for man. He tells us not to kill, yet he retains for himself the right to take human life. Thus, he is not himself bound to obey the Ten Commandments or any other law given to man in Scripture. Morally, he is on an entirely different level from us. Therefore, he has the right to do many things that seem evil to us, even things which contradict Scriptural norms. For a man to cause evil indirectly might very well be wrong, but it would not be wrong for God. {But on this basis, it would also not be wrong for God to cause evil directly. That is why I said this argument makes the indirect-cause argument beside the point.} Thus Clark neatly finesses any argument against God's justice or goodness.

There is some truth in this approach. As we shall see, Scripture does forbid human criticism of God's actions, and the reason is, as Clark implies, divine transcendence. It is also true that God has some prerogatives that he forbids to us, such as the freedom to take human life.

Clark forgets, however, or perhaps denies, the Reformed and biblical maxim that the law reflects God's own character. To obey the law is to imitate God, to be like him, to image him (Ex. 20:11; Lev. 11:44-45; Matt. 5:45; 1 Peter 1:15-16). There is in biblical ethics also an imitation of Christ, centered on the atonement (John 13:34-35; Eph. 4:32; 5:1; Phil. 2:3ff.; 1 John 3:16; 4:8-10). Obviously, there is much about God that we cannot imitate, including those prerogatives mentioned earlier. Satan tempted Eve into seeking to become "like God" in the sense of coveting His prerogatives (Gen. 3:5). {John Murray said that the difference between the two ways of seeking God's likeness appears to be a razor's edge, while there is actually a deep chasm between them.} But the overall holiness, justice, and goodness of God is something we can and must imitate on the human level.

So God does honor, in general, the same law that he gives to us. He rules out murder because he hates to see one human being murder another, and he intends to reserve for himself the right to control human death. He prohibits adultery because he hates adultery (which is a mirror of idolatry—see Hosea). We can be assured that God will behave according to the same standards of holiness that he prescribes for us, except insofar as Scripture declares a difference between his responsibilities and ours.

{Oddly, Clark, who is usually accused of being a Platonic realist, at this point veers into the opposite of realism, namely, nominalism. The extreme nominalists held that the biblical laws were not reflections of God's nature, but merely arbitrary requirements. God could have as easily commanded adultery as forbidden it. I mentioned this once in a letter to Clark, and he appreciated the irony, but did not provide an answer. Why, I wonder, didn't he deal with moral law the same way he dealt with reason and logic in, e.g., The Johannine Logos (Nutley, N.J.: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1972)? There he argued that God's reason/logic was neither above God (Plato) nor below God (nominalism), but God's own rational nature. Why did he not take the same view of God's moral standards?}

[From: Apologetics to the Glory of God (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1994), 166-68.]

Frame concludes that Clark's ex lex defense "simply is not biblical." I think he's right.
[source]

I think the above quotes are in keeping with the view that some modern Christian theologians/philosophers/apologists hold and sometimes call "Divine Command Essentialism" (William Lane Craig being one of the more popular proponents who actually uses that term). It seems to combine the advantages and eliminate the disadvantages of Divine Essentialism alone (simpliciter) and Divine Voluntarism alone (simpliciter).

On the one hand...

In Latin the word voluntas means "will." One of the main and most discussed problems with Divine Voluntarism (which is commonly expressed in the most common versions of the Divine Command Theory of morality [DCT]) is that it would make God's moral commands arbitrary. God could have theoretically assigned murder, rape and theft as virtues since on divine voluntarism what God wills and commands is the reason why some things are "good" and "right" while other things are "wrong" and "evil."

On the other hand...

One of the problems of Divine Essentialism on a Christian perspective is that it doesn't seem to a account for some Divine commands in the Bible that do seem to be arbitrary and wouldn't necessarily flow from God's nature. For example, the dietary laws in the Old Testament. Most Christian theologians/apologists would agree that they were given for multiple purposes. One of those purposes was to teach the Israelites how God separated and consecrated them from all other gentile nations. By giving the dietary laws in the Old Testament that distinguished between clean and unclean meats as He did, God was teaching the Israelites to see themselves as the consecrated people that they were. In that sense all of God's laws reflect and are grounded in God's nature and authority. However, those dietary laws were in some sense arbitrary and don't necessarily flow from God's nature/essence. There's nothing intrinsically evil or contrary to God's nature in swine. That's why such Old Covenant laws were able to be abrogated (or at least superceded) by the New Covenant laws and principles so that it's now permissible (though not required) to eat foods that were formerly considered unclean under the Old Covenant. Similar to how the principles of aerodynamics supercede the law of gravity. While other Old Covenant laws (which were typological) were fulfilled in Jesus Christ (the antitype).

Another problem with Divine Essentialism is that God sometimes gives commands which seem prima facie to contradict God's nature of love. For example, God's command to Abraham to sacrifice his only son.

Additionally, if one is a Calvinist, simple Divine Essentialism would seem to conflict with (or even contradict) the Calvinist understanding of reprobation (see my related blog HERE).

Divine Command Essentialism (DCE, not to be confused with ordinary DCT) holds that values and virtues flow from God's nature, while our moral duties as God's creatures flow from His will as they are expressed in His commands to us. Yet in some sense they also reflect God's nature/essence. It (DCE) seems to be a synthesis of both divine essentialism and divine voluntarism. Such a view 1. affirms God as the standard and paradigm of virtue and goodness [possessing all moral virtues to their highest degree], 2. exonerates God from being arbitrary, 3. allowing for (and accounting for) God's ability to act and command in ways that don't obviously or directly flow from God's nature or essence , and 4. nevertheless grounding God's commands in God's nature such that in some sense they always reflect that good nature.

A common objection to God being the standard of goodness is that it's actually not saying anything. It's a tautology. It's circular because all you're really saying is "God's nature is that which is God's nature" or " God is being God-like." But that objection is like asking the question, "What's north of the north pole?" Or, "Why is a bachelor and unmarried man?" The north pole is north by definition, just like bachelors are unmarried men by definition. The reason why we have a moral sense in the first place is because God implanted it within us by making us in His moral and rational image. To question God being the standard of goodness is to assume morality and goodness exist outside of God. It is to beg the question [i.e. circular reasoning] about the source of goodness and morality. Unless and until a better explanation is offered for the source of morality and goodness one cannot even begin to judge, evaluate or object to God's being the standard and source of goodness and morality.

It might be asked, "If our moral sense comes from God, why do many of God's commands in the Bible seem to contradict our moral intuitions?" One of the reasons is because we're applying to God moral categories and duties that we have toward creatures to God. As William Lane Craig said,

But then what about God's command to Abraham to sacrifice his son Isaac? Did God have the right to command such a thing and was Abraham morally obligated to obey? I am inclined simply to bite the bullet and say, "Yes, God did have the right and Abraham was so obligated." The uncomfortableness of this answer can perhaps be mitigated by the realization that God has the right to do certain things that would be immoral for a human person to do on his own initiative. For example, I do not have the right to kill another innocent person. But God, as the author and giver of life, has that prerogative. If He should choose to strike me dead right now, that is His right. (Notice how opponents of capital punishment, for example, will often say to its proponents, "Who do you think you are to play God?") Thus, Abraham would not have the right on his own initiative to take Isaac's life, for that would be murder. But if God should command Abraham to take Isaac's life, then the situation is different because Abraham is now no longer acting on his own but rather as the agent of God. God does not have the ability to command Abraham to commit murder; but God does have the ability to command Abraham to do something (viz., kill Isaac) which would have been murder had God not commanded it, i.e., if Abraham had undertaken the act on his own initiative in the absence of a divine command. This seems to me to be a coherent solution to the problem.

The case of Abraham and Isaac is, as I say, the exception that proves the rule. God doesn't normally issue such extraordinary commands, and so we should be highly sceptical of someone who says, "God has commanded me to kill soandso!" I do not mean in Prof. Curley's words that "normally God does not command us to do anything wrong; it's only occasionally that he does that, as in the case of Abraham and Isaac." Rather I mean that normally God doesn't command us to do anything which is such that, in the absence of a divine command, it would be morally wrong for us to do; the case of Abraham and Isaac is presented in Scripture as a highly unusual case.

I do think that these same considerations are relevant for the case of the destruction of the Canaanites at God's command. The Israeli armies were acting as God's agents to carry out God's judgement upon desperately corrupt nations which God had spared for 400 years until their wickedness made them ripe for judgement. Later God would also judge Israel by means of destruction by the pagan armies of Assyria and Babylon. In commanding the Israeli army to utterly exterminate the Canaanites, God was commanding them to do something, which in the absence of a divine command, they would have had no right to do. God had, however, morally sufficient reasons for issuing such an extraordinary command, namely to preserve Israel from apostasy through infection with Canaanite religion. Israel did not in fact obey God's command, and as a result Israel did succumb repeatedly to apostasy, which finally brought the judgement of God upon Israel itself. All of this is admittedly very disconcerting, but it is a reminder that a holy God may not pass comfortably into our modern Western concept of God as the big Sugar Daddy in the sky.
These are difficult questions; but consider the alternative: moral nihilism.

One has to eventually ask, "How can ultimate goodness be impersonal?" How can goodness and morality be grounded in a materialistic worldview? Even given Atheistic Moral Platonism which posits immaterial forms or idea, these ideas aren't personal. Positing Platonic forms may give one models for ideal behavior, but since they aren't personal they cannot truly obligate. There are real moral obligations and only persons can obligate us. If one agrees there are universal obligations, then one ought also to agree that we are obligated by a universal person, namely God. Causally effete abstract entities cannot obligate persons. Craig even questions whether atheistic moral Platonism is rationally coherent.

If God were really morally perfect and the very source of morality, then it naturally follows that to disobey God is, by definition, immoral. God, being the kind of Being God is, ought to be obeyed. That's an eminently rational reason to obey God.

Is Atheistic Moral Platonism More Plausible Than Theism?
(video link)

Divine Command Essenatialism answers the Euthyphro Dilemma. Socrates wanted to know "the good" regardless of men or the gods thought. In Plato's dialogues Socrates asked Euthyphro whether the pious (i.e. the holy or the good) was beloved of the gods (and willed by them) because it was pious, or whether it was pious/good because beloved by (and willed by) the gods. In modern times the question is often asked this way (especially by atheists); Is what God commands good because it is good, or is it good because God commands it? Among polytheists the question is especially problematic since the gods may disagree regarding which values and virtues have greater priority or which aren't values and virtues at all. For example, the god of war (Mars/Ares) may disagree with the god of love (Venus/Aphrodite). If the gods disagree, then the problem of subjectivity and competing views resurfaces even though Euthyphro originally appealed to the gods to overcome the subjectivity and moral relativism that exists among human beings.

In the context of Christian monotheism, if what God commands is good because it is good then that would necessitate that there are absolutes outside of God. Something which classic Christian theology would deny because it conflicts with divine aseity. However, if what God commands is good merely because God commands it on the basis of His sheer will, then that suffers from the problem of divine voluntarism mentioned above. Namely, that God could then theoretically assign things like murder, theft and rape as "good" and even command them. Moreover, God could arbitrarily change his commands in an inconsistent and contradictory way. Finally, God could renege on His promises by making other contradictory promises and commands.

Divine Command Essentialism seems to solve these problems and therefore should be considered a viable option for Christians to hold (even if not the only option). It also appears that Divine Command Essentialism seems to be best grounded in the conception of God found in the Ontological argument for God's existence where God is defined as the greatest conceivable or possible being who possesses all perfections and excellencies to their highest and fullest degree. For example, great making properties like omnipotence, omniscience (all-knowing), omnisapience (all-wise), omnibenevolence (or moral perfection, if one is uncomfortable with the term "omnibenevolence") etc.

The following is a HIGHLY RECOMMENDED link to William Lane Craig's Reasonable Faith podcast where he discusses Divine Command Essentialism. Craig is not a Calvinist, but his description of Divine Command Essentialism can be modified to fit in with Calvinism.

How are Morals Objectively Grounded in God?

(mp3 file)

See also:

The Euthyphro Dilemma

(William Lane Craig)
https://youtu.be/wBvi_auKkaI

Here's a PODCAST on the Euthyphro Dilemma with William Lane Craig

Another PODCAST.

On a related topic:

According to my limited understanding, some of the church fathers and medieval theologians (being influenced by neo-Platonism for better or worse) sometimes argued that evil is the privation, negation and twisting of the good. Also, borrowing from the neo-Platonic scale/chain of being the "good" was related to that which is pure and perfect being (i.e. God who is pure being and actuality) while "evil" to that which tends towards non-being (potentiality and ultimately to nothingness). I suppose we can combine this insight with the ontological argument to argue for how all virtues and excellencies (in being and in character) meet at the top, namely in God. And that's another reason for why appeal to God's nature and character as the paragon/paradigm/exemplar of goodness isn't arbitrary.

This would help in response to atheistic arguments against God being the ultimate moral authority. For example atheistic arguments against appealing to the Imago Dei as another reason to argue for God being the exemplar of morality. Atheists have argued that on that view if people were created by Satan in Satan's image they would have a moral obligation to do as he instructed. However, given the ontological argument for God's existence then morality based on God's nature wouldn't be arbitrary because goodness is, by necessity, related to being. To perfect and supreme being, namely God who is the greatest conceivable and possible being.

Again, See also my blogposts: Why Obey God?

Distinctions in God's Will from a Calvinist Perspective

P.S.

For the sake of full disclosure I want to point out that some modern Christian apologists, theologians and philosophers don't limit the definition of evil to privation, negation and the twisting of the good. In fact, some reject that approach of defining evil altogether.

See also William Lane Craig's Q&A #387:

If ISIS’s God Were Real, Would I Be Obliged to Follow Him?

As well as Steve Hays' blogpost:

Must purported revelation pass a moral test?

See also my blogposts:

The Evil God Hypothesis: Some Observations and Answers

Distinctions in God's Will from a Calvinist Perspective

Why Obey God?

Evil God Challenge Revisited