It's common to hear non-Christians, especially atheists claim that the God of the Bible has a fragile ego. Does he?
Not at all. God's zeal for His glory is not merely a matter of ego or pride, but of holiness. In one sense, God, being as great and super-competent as He is, rightly ought to brag. Something that, in excess, is immodest and immoral in finite creatures.
However, additionally, it would be idolatrous for God to not love and magnify that which is worthy and deserving of all honor and devotion, namely Himself. It's an act not only of self love, but of love to the creature for God to promote His own glory. Since He is the source of all goodness. God giving Himself to creatures is the most loving thing He could do. It leads to their eternal blessedness, joy and fulfillment. John Piper explains that in his books 1. Desiring God, 2. The Pleasures of God, 3. Future Grace. Here's a quick 1 1/2 minute video where he introduces the subject:
Hope you've been well!!!! Not sure if you've answered this already, but is it possible for a necessary being to be all-evil? I would think it's not. That only an all-good being can be a necessary being.
My response:
I agree. I could say more, but here's a succinct response to the challenge. I recommend William Lane Craig's debates against Peter Millican [or Here] and Stephen Law, and the times he has addressed this issue in his Question of the Week articles [e.g. #387, and #238] . See also his podcasts on the topic.
I. Presuppositionally, it seems to me that non-theists have a difficult (if not impossible) time making sense of objective good and evil. Therefore, unless and until non-theists rationally provide an independent standard or source of goodness (and therefore a basis for also identifying evil), they cannot launch the "Evil God Hypothesis" challenge as an **External** critique. It can only be an **Internal** critique. However, if Christian theism were shown to be internally consistent, then the "Evil God" challenge against Christianity would fail. And I don't see such internal contradiction.
II. There are different ways of defining "evil". I'll focus on one. One way Augustine did (which he borrowed from Platonism and Neoplatonism) was to see evil as privation, deviation, negation, twisting, defection [think defect], corruption [etc.] "from" or "of" the good and of being. In the Neoplatonic scale/chain of being, being was good, and non-being was evil. There's a Christian analog to that. God originally created all things good. However, evil is that which goes contrary to God's design and/or revealed will for the character of creatures. Evil has no independent existence and being. Evil is parasitic on the good. Evil doesn't have positive ontological reality/status. It's like coldness. It's the absence of heat (to some degree or another). Or a shadow, the absence of light (to some degree or another). An analogy would be like that of a perfect dress. If part of the dress were eaten by a moth, then that would be an "evil" in the dress (which could represent the world or some other being). A perfectly evil dress would be no dress at all because it has been completely eaten by moths. Similarly, a perfectly evil God would be no God (or any type of being) at all. Even the devil, who is arguably the most wicked of creatures has soon good qualities. Qualities that reflect God's original good creation and His communicable attributes. For example, the devil has personality and possesses extremely high intelligence. These are good things in themselves, but he harnesses them in a way contrary to God's revealed will for His creatures. In other words, the devil commits/does evil.
Concerning this paragraph, recall my blogposts: http://misclane.blogspot.com/2013/11/distinctions-in-gods-will-from.html http://misclane.blogspot.com/2014/05/god-in-relation-to-law-ex-lex-sub-lego.html
III. Steve Hays has addressed the Evil God challenge multiple times at Triablogue. One of his common points is that the issue is ultimately irrelevant. As Steve wrote in a YouTube comment:
//What argument in particular? The evil god hypothesis? That's just a poor man's version of the Cartesian demon........If the evil god existed, that would be a defeater for atheism no less than Christian theism, so assuming we're supposed to take that thought-experiment seriously, the onus lies on the atheist as much as the Christian. If the evil god exists, there's nothing anyone can do about it. Arguments are futile in that event. If the evil god doesn't exist, arguments are unnecessary in that regard.?//
In other words, if one were to take the Evil God Hypothesis seriously, then it would immediately become a moot point.
IV. I've shown above that a perfectly evil God couldn't exist ontologically. Some theists like William Lane Craig also argue that such a being couldn't exist given the definition of "God" and what's called "perfect being theology" in the theological and philosophical literature. Craig basically defines away the possibility of such an Evil God. Something that has some merit, but which wouldn't be very persuasive for non-theists (and especially anti-theists). In the Western theological and philosophical tradition since Anselm, God has often been defined as the greatest conceivable being, possessing all great making properties [in every possible world]. Such a Maximally Great Being would be morally perfect because moral perfection is one of those great making properties it would necessarily have and possess. Since an "Evil God" would purportedly be both a morally imperfect AND a morally perfect being at the same time and in the same sense, it's a contradictory concept, and contradictions are impossible. Therefore, such a being cannot possibly exist. Just as a Square Circle cannot exist. At most, there could only be a very evil and very powerful being, but that being couldn't be "God" or an "Evil God" [i.e. "God" as defined in the Ontological Argument or Anselmian way]. Let's call such a finite being who is very evil [but not perfectly evil], very intelligent [but not omniscient or omnisapient] and very powerful [but not omnipotent] an Evil god [lower case "g"]. Or, better yet, Very Evil Greatly Empowered Spirit [VEGES]. Incidentally, three year olds inherently dislike VEGES. Especially green ones.
V. Rationally a Very Evil Spirit [i.e. VEGES] doesn't make much sense. From the atheistic proponents of the Evil God Hypothesis [EGH] I understand that such a being would perform both good and evil things in such a way to maximize suffering, but that we wouldn't be able to tell from the percentages of evil and good that the being was either good or evil. The main point of the EGH is to undermine the evidence for the existence of God based on all the good we DO see in the world. Craig has pointed out that theists don't at all (or don't merely IMO) conclude that God is good based on an inductive survey of the balance of good and evil in the world. There are other evidences and arguments that support the existence of God (e.g. the Moral Argument, the Contingency Argument, the Kalam Cosmological Argument et al.). A proponent of EGH could argue that every evidence and argument for God could appear plausible to us only because the Evil God/Spirit/Cartesian Demon tampers with our brains to make us think they are plausible or valid or even sound. Such a powerful being could be tricking us to think that 2 + 2 = 4, when in actuality [ad arguendo] 4 is the wrong answer. If that's the case, then all argument is moot, as Hays pointed out.
But assuming at least some of our observations and ratiocinations are reliable, then an Evil Spirit [VEGES] doesn't make much rational sense. Such a being would seem to more likely create an unpredictable cartoonish world than the world that we actually observe; which is intricately structured, uniform, elegant, mathematical, consistent and apparently designed and finely-tuned. When we consider all of the physical sciences [e.g. physics, cosmology, cosmogony, chemistry etc.], it seems to me to be clear that if there was a very powerful being who created the world we live in it would have to be EXTREMELY intelligent. Yet, what possible motivation could such a very intelligent and rational being have for maximizing the evil or calamity or suffering in the world? Wouldn't such a being have enough of an ego and self-esteem so as to challenge itself to create something wonderful rather than awful? Making awful things is easy. idiots can do it. But making/creating wonderful things is hard. Executing the latter would be better for its self-esteem than the former since its creation(s) would be a reflection of its own nature and character. That's consistent with a maximally great being, viz. God. Though, admittedly it's conceivable that a finite Evil Spirit [VEGES] might have low self-esteem and so wreaks havoc on its creatures like a disturbed child who burns insects using a magnifying glass. But such petty behavior would seem to be beneath the dignity of a highly intelligent finite being [much less a maximally great one]. This makes some sense even if the Spirit doesn't intend for us to know it or worship it. However, were such a being to exist, it's also the case that there are other rational conscious agents which it created that can evaluate its creation, namely us human beings. Wouldn't such a being want to impress us with its power and wisdom [cf. Rom. 1:19-20ff.] instead of the lack of power and wisdom? How much more if it does want us to worship it? IF it WOULD want us to worship it for its moral perfections even though it secretly knows its own evil behavior, that would seem to lead to its Cognitive Dissonance. Intelligence usually prefers consistency over inconsistency. The consistency and uniformity we see in the physical world would imply an internal rational, existential and psychological consistency on the part of the creator/Creator that argues against the VEGES favoring, creating, planning and enjoying pointless evil and suffering.
VI. If a VEGES existed, then it would (IMO) likely NOT make the evidence for one religion greater than that for others. Yet, from my (admittedly) limited inductive research (and that of others whose research I stand on), the case for Christianity is much stronger than for other worldviews. If the religions of the world were inspired by the VEGES to confuse mankind, then why providentially make Christianity have a better apologetical case for it than (most or [apparently via induction] all) other worldviews? If that's true, then that tips the scales away from an VEGES. For at least two reasons. 1. There's independent evidence for the truth of Christianity and its specific God, as Craig has pointed out. So, that tips the scales away from and equal 50/50 balance. 2. Given EGH/VEGES, it's unlikely that any one theistic worldview would have better credentials. It's true that one could argue that the EG/VEGES could have providentially created the Christian religion for it to be worshipped (along with the other religions). But that suffers from at least two problems. 1. The Cognitive Dissonance I mentioned above. 2. The numbers of people who worship the Christian God, while consistent with Calvinism, is not so consistent with a being that wants to (nearly?) maximize belief and devotion to it from its creatures. Though, in all honesty, and to play the VEGES advocate, this is not strictly illogical/inconsistent. Especially since such a being could have created multiple worlds/universes, some of which have entire civilizations that uniformly worship it, so that of all rational creatures in the entire multiverse, only a small percentage of them don't worship it in one similar form [a form that intersects all universes but that's also dishonest since it doesn't accurately represent its true nature and character]. Or, given all civilizations in all universes, on average, there is no singular worldview that has better credentials. However, WE only have this world/globe to do an inductive investigation, and IMO Christianity does stand out better than the rest. Logical possibilities which we have no evidence for shouldn't automatically trump inductive observations.
See my blogpost here on a related topic: http://misclane.blogspot.com/2017/08/the-problem-of-evil-brief-conversation.html
VII. Finally, the existence of Evil, if acknowledged and granted as a premise, suggests or even requires an ultimate Good. The Moral Argument for God's Existence (argued by many theists like William Lane Craig) has as its corollary the inference that evil (and evils) actually proves the existence of God. Theists have argued that objective evil can only exist in contrast to an objective standard of Good/Goodness. Such a standard is more plausibly personal than impersonal [see video below]. Therefore, if objective evil exists and can only exist if God [the maximally great being] exists, then God exists. In which case NEITHER the Evil God [of the EGH] or the Very Evil Greatly Empowered Spirit exist [since God does exist], and their Hypotheses fail as a challenge to theism and (IMO) especially Christian Theism.
Is Atheistic Moral Platonism More Plausible Than Theism?
A person in an atheist Facebook Group I'm a member of posted the following comments in relation to a video segment of Christopher Hitchens where he answers a sobering question by the moderator. The segment of the video is at the following link at 30 minutes and 30 seconds: https://youtu.be/2j3VU1T8ALU?t=30m30s
Christopher Hitchens vs 4 Christians - Does the god of Christianity exist?
Jim (not his real name) wrote:
I'd already been past the point of no-return on my voyage to the free side, but I remember first seeing this and being struck by the obviousness of Christopher's point, and Doug Wilson's pathetic response.
Yeah, yeah, yeah, I know the theist will bark, "Appeal to emotion!!!" But, think that your only real retort is, "I've no fucking idea why God allows/designed this, but he must have a good reason. We'll find out in Theology 101 in Heaven."
The following is my response:
Hitchens seems to caricature the Christian claim by saying we say it's (only) for the weak, poor, sickly, ill-connected and disenfranchised. No, it's for everyone, not just the weak etc. But I can let that go because he may have just misspoken and knows that we don't limit it to the weak. Also, the questioner's point is that Christianity has something to say and offer to the weak (et cetera). Whereas atheism and *atheistic* evolution doesn't (as opposed to *theistic* evolution, or some other form of theistic creationism)
Then Hitchens objects to God's omniscience. There's nothing immoral about God employing "round the clock surveillance" (to use Hitchens phraseology). Just because Hitchens doesn't like it doesn't mean it's morally wrong. Even Hitchens would have probably agreed that there is no absolute right to absolute privacy. He would have probably agreed that human governments sometimes have the right to do investigations when crimes are suspected. If that's true for fallible sinful human governments, how much more for an infallible and perfectly righteous Judge, namely God?
Hitchens complains that with the conception of the Christian God there are such things as "thought crimes". In this Age (i.e. before the return of Christ) in human governments not all sins are crimes. Meaning, some sins are not crimes which can legitimately be punished by governments. But if governments can judge at least some sins (i.e. sins that happen to also be crimes), why can't God judge all sins?
The complaint might be that these are merely thoughts and not real actions, and therefore shouldn't be punished. However, they nevertheless still reflect the character of the persons who commit those sinful thoughts. In Christianity not all thoughts of evil are evil. There's a distinction between knowledge of evil and evil knowledge. Knowing and thinking about evil, is not the same thing as sinfully relishing in evil. Also, in Christianity, temptations aren't sinful. They turn into sins when acted upon or relished and enjoyed in thought. For God to not judge all sins is for God to not be truly, perfectly and absolutely righteous and good. So, it's possible to think thoughts of evil, and even be tempted by them, without them becoming evil thoughts. When a human judge punishes a convicted criminal, that's an expression of his goodness. Its judges who are evil who don't punish crimes when they are in a position to do so. In the same way, it would be evil for God not to eventually judge all sins. In God's mercy He sometimes delays judgment to allow time for repentance. There are many reasons why God may not immediately intervene to prevent the commission of all sins and crimes. Take some following examples:
-We need some degree of freedom for genuine personhood.
-Some degree of freedom may require (at least temporarily) the possibility of (moral and/or natural) evil.
-The (temporary) existence of evil is also necessary for the formation and development of souls (cf. Soul Making/Developing/Building Theodicies in the philosophic and theological literature).
Hitchens then goes on to quote/paraphrase (George?) Orwell that all totalitarianism is essentially theocratic. That's just a case of "poisoning the well" by linking totalitarianism with God's rule. In fact, many totalitarian regimes have been atheistic. If his point is that the concept of God entails that God is a totalitarian, then a more accurate and objective analysis is to say that theocratic totalitarianism by God is essentially atheistic (rather than the reverse as Orwell allegedly said). Meaning, if God were really totalitarian, then He's actually an atheist (in/by his behavior). This is especially true if/when one applies Perfect Being Theology to the question of whether God could do/perform evil deeds. Given perfect being theology, there are some actions which God not only wouldn't but couldn't perform (contrary to divine voluntarism).
Most Christian apologists deny divine voluntarism and hold to some form of divine essentialism (e.g. Divine Command Essentialism). Voluntarism would say that God can and may literally do anything. Whereas some form of essentialism says that God would not and may not do anything contrary to His own good nature. There is a sense in which God chooses His nature, and that (simultaneously) His nature comes to expression in His will. There is no contradiction or conflict between the two.
Hitchens then goes to say that it's wrong for (or disagreeable to him) that God cannot be "voted out" of office (so to speak) . Well, just because you don't like something doesn't mean it isn't true, isn't good, isn't right or isn't actually the case. Besides, if God really is a perfectly good and just/righteous, why would anyone want to "vote Him out"? Only evil people would want that (literally). It might be argued that some of God's behavior is evil. But that's what's in dispute. What's also in dispute is the standard by which we can judge something as good or bad (I've addressed this topic HERE and HERE). We can eventually argue about those details and whether the Christian conception of God is actually evil, but are atheists willing to agree and admit (at least theoretically) that if God really were perfectly just that we shouldn't want Him voted out and that it would be a beneficial and appropriate thing for such a God to reign and rule the omniverse?
Hitchens then goes on to say that the concept of the Christian God makes a parody of fatherhood. Here Hitchens (as he often did) demonstrated his ignorance of basic Christian teaching. God is not just a Father but a Judge. Human judges can have conflicting duties as parents and judges. In such instances the duties of being a judge should take priority over the duties of being a parent because it can involve public justice, the public good and provide a public example (among other things). The same is true for God.
Moreover, while there is a sense in which God is the ontological/metaphysical father of all beings (sentient or inanimate), there is another sense in which God is only a Father in a redemptive sense for those who are in relationship with Him through the New Covenant Gospel. So, not everyone are among the children of God in this redemptive sense. God has the right to judge those who are not in such a relationship with Him as if they aren't His children (which they aren't). In God's mercy and grace He has provided salvation through the sacrifice of His Son whom He sent into the world. The Son (Jesus) willing and joyfully laid down His life to provide salvation for lost humanity. While it is the Holy Spirit who willingly and joyfully applies the benefits of the Cross to people.
Hitchens goes on to say that instead of making sure his children prosper, God will sit in judgment and everlasting condemnation against them. He quipped sarcastically as if speaking for God, "You'll never hear the end of me. You'll never see the back of me." However, it's only appropriate for God to justly judge the world. Would one rather have God not justly judge the world? Or judge it unjustly as well as prevent final and ultimate justice to prevail? If the complaint is that God's judgment is eternal and therefore unfair/unjust, I have two points to say in regard to that.
1. Maybe annihilationism is true. If so, then the suffering will one day end.
2. I myself don't hold to annihilationism, nevertheless the nature of eternal conscious torment isn't clear in the Bible. It may not be physical at all, or not primarily physical. It might be mostly mental and emotional (e.g. the torment of having missed out on eternal life/bliss/prosperity, the torment of shame and condemnation etc.).
In response to the question about weakness he gives the instance of the daughter (Elisabeth Fritzl) who was locked up by her father and repeatedly raped for years. He complains that God "folded His arms" and didn't do anything in His indifference. First off, Hitchens would (later?) mention the same case in his debate with William Lane Craig. Right before mentioning the case of fraulein Fritzl, Hitchens said, "If I was a believer, I would not feel [that] God owed me an explanation. I'm not one of those atheists who thinks you can go around saying...[pause]....complaining. I mean, if you make the assumption that there is a deity, then all things are possible. You just have to be able to make that assumption."- Christopher Hitchens in his debate with William Lane Craig at 2:19:55 into the debate here: https://youtu.be/0tYm41hb48o?t=2h19m55s
Secondly, God will not indefinitely do nothing. God will one day judge the father, Josef Fritzl. So, God is not indifferently folding His arms. Some might object by saying, "Delayed justice is justice denied" [i.e. no justice at all]. Especially if that delay allows for greater and prolonged commission of evil and enduring of suffering. But there's no way for us finite creatures to be able to determine or calculate that it's not the case that the eventual positive benefits of delaying judgment outweighs the negatives of that postponement. Hitchens' mere intuition that it's not just or good of God to allow such evil is not a good argument, much less a knockdown argument. See William Lane Craig's videos on the Problem of Evil. Some of which I've collected here: https://misclane.blogspot.com/2017/05/the-problem-of-evil-by-william-lane.html
Thirdly, I already alluded to the theodicial concept that God allows significant freedom in this Age in order to allow for the possibility of building souls through the trials we go through in this world to prepare people for the next world/Age.
Fourthly, It may be asked, "What if in such horrible circumstances no one is saved? Wouldn't that mean that God allowed their suffering for no purpose at all?" This touches upon the issue of predestination and providence. As a Calvinist this objection is even more pressing on my position than on a more Arminian positions. I've addressed this issue many times in my various comments in Triablogue. This issue is too deep for me to address for the purposes of this blogpost. So, I'll only say something briefly (though a whole blogpost or series of blogposts could be dedicated to this single issue). Suffice it to say, for the purposes of this blogpost, that in God's goodness He is not obligated to supply maximal goodness to everyone equally. Compare the concept of privatio boni in relation to the existence of evil. It's not evil on God's part to withhold maximal goodness, and God is sovereign in the degree to which He chooses to mete out grace, mercy and goodness. The doctrine of omnibenevolence is not that God must be maximally good to all equally, but that whatever God does is good and may not be evil, irrational or illogical. This is why I disagree with the common definition of omnibenevolence that most atheists and atheologists use. It's not attenuated by Biblical teaching, and so is a strawman when applied specifically to Christianity.
If God were to be maximally good to all creatures then that would logically and necessarily impinge on His creativity. For example, if every creature could breath under water, fly in the air, climb trees with their tails, be as intelligent and immaterial as angels (etc.) there would be no fish, no birds, no monkeys, no angels etc. Since body designs by logical necessity are different than other designs. If every creature were a metamorph, that would affect the possibility of the creation of stable and uniquely beautiful ecosystems. As I said, it would impinge on God's creativity and the Principle of Plenitude.
Back to the issue of "Wouldn't that mean that God allowed their suffering for no purpose at all? [if none in such a situation were saved]". That assumes the only purpose God has is salvation. But that's contrary to the teaching of the Bible. There are various multi-level, multivalent and interconnecting purposes that God has for things that He allows (or even ordains) to happen which have no relation (or no direct relation) to salvation at all.
Fifthly, God in His justice has a right to allow the consequences of sin to take its course. That includes the continued and growing manifestation of evil. The continuation, spread and intensification of evil, can (in some sense and level) itself be a manifestation of temporal judgment before the Final Judgment.
Hitchens then says regarding the case of fraulein Fritzl that (in essence) "Christians say that's alright that she endured what she did because she'll eventually get a better life. So in the end it was worth going throug it all" (paraphrase). Here again Hitchens reveals his ignorance of Christian doctrine and or logical reasoning. To say that it was ultimately good that X happened, is not the same thing as endorsing it, approving of it, sanctioning it, or saying it wasn't actually evil, or denying it shouldn't have been done. That's a logical non-sequitur. There's a huge difference between ***all things BEING EQUAL*** and X being something finite creatures have the moral duty of never doing, and ***all things CONSIDERED*** it was best for X, in this specific instance Y, to have happened.
Finally, Notice that Hitchens never answered the man's question. The man's question was what could atheism offer (in terms of hope, comfort etc.) to the weak, poor, sickly, ill-connected and disenfranchised? It seems to me that atheism has nothing to offer but despair.
The person on Facebook (whom I called "Jim") who asked the question wrote,
Yeah, yeah, yeah, I know the theist will bark, "Appeal to emotion!!!" But, think that your only real retort is, "I've no fucking idea why God allows/designed this, but he must have a good reason. We'll find out in Theology 101 in Heaven."
I agree that most of what Hitchens said was an appeal to emotion. Hitchens didn't given any good logical or informed reason why atheism can offer the weak anything beneficial. In fact, given Darwinism, one could argue that it's good for the weak to die off. Nor were Hitchens objections based on an informed knowledge of what Christians believe or what apologists have said. Like many atheists he was just speaking to himself and his fellow atheists in their atheistic bubbles/conclaves/echo chambers.
Also, what's wrong with saying that we don't know all of the reasons why God allows/designed such evil and suffering to come to pass? The fact is that we do know at least some of the reasons based on what the Bible says and what can be further inferred (deductively, inductively, abductively, reductively etc.). It's an unreasonable demand to know all the reasons for why God allows all of the evils and sufferings He does allow. For something this complex, isn't it reasonable to conclude that our finite minds would not be able to grasp all the complex intertwining nexus of reasons? That it would require omniscience to know and understand all the reasons? Shouldn't the fact that we know *some* of the reasons why God allows evil and suffering relieve and release some of the pressure and tension that the various problem of evil arguments are meant to induce?
Normally, I'm not impressed by Douglas Wilson's apologetic against atheism (even though, like him, I'm a Van Tillian presuppositionalist). Nevertheless, in this segment his answers make a lot of sense. His point is that given Christianity there will be final and ultimate justice and there can be future hope for the saved. Along with that, given Christianity one is able to coherently and justifiably say that in Christianity there are such things as objective goods and objective evils. We can ontologically ground objective values. Whereas given atheism there is no final and ultimate justice or future hope of eternal life. Nor are there such things as objective goods, evils or values under atheism. Or if there are, they are not obvious. In fact, atheistic philosophers struggle to metaphysically ground objective morality. So much so that many atheists have given up on the possibility and say there are no objective morals.
In conclusion, I think in this segment Christopher Hitchens once again showed that he was a rhetorician whose forte was in influencing other people's views by primarily using appeals to emotion (pathos), instead of logic and reason (logos). Hitchens was a smart and quick witted individual, but he was not a deep thinker on the issues related to God's existence, goodness and theology in general. His answers were often very superficial precisely because he suffered from self-reinforced ignorance of what theists and apologists actually believe and argue.
The following further records my conversation with "Jim"
Jim wrote:
Thank
you for taking the time to create your blog post, but there is quite a
bit of errors in it. HItchens didn't make the claim about Christianity
being for the downtrodden, that was the moderator. Christopher was
responding to that claim to show it wasn't.
Also,
you are really missing his point about the constant surveillance, it
has zero to do with modern life in the West. It is more akin to North
Korea. Though many Christians proclaim they are slaves to Jesus, which
is what Christopher finds so revolting.
YOu also
miss the point about "thoughtcrime". Humans can't even control their
own thoughts. Try it, you won't be able to. Clearly Hitchens doens't
believe there is such a diety with that power. And .clearly the authors
of those prohibitions new it was impossible to meet them. It just put
one on guard to avoid going from bad thought (adultery) to actual
adultery.
At the end of the day, you don't grapple
with the main point other than to acknowledge it. You're only answer
to human and animal suffering is to say "God is mysterious." If that
does it for you, that does it for you.
And yes, if
one doesn't believe there is a God, like me. The fight for justice
comes in the only life we know we have. In the here and now. Also,
given a naturalistic view of life on earth, there is no mystery why evil
occassionally triumphs. It is the result of humans being merely
evolved primates. It is what you would expect to happen with no one at
the controls.
Christianity posits and all loving
and powerful God at the controls, but he doesn't see to give a shit. He
may in fact enjoy it. The poor apologists only answer is "God moves in
mysterious ways."
"HItchens didn't make the claim about Christianity being for the downtrodden, that was the moderator. Christopher was responding to that claim to show it wasn't. "
I didn't say that Hitchens believed it was for the downtrodden. I said that he said it was the Christian claim that it was (only?) for the downtrodden/weak. Notice too that I gave Hitchens a pass on that because he may have just imprecisely misspoke in haste (something we all do at times).
" It is more akin to North Korea. Though many Christians proclaim they are slaves to Jesus, which is what Christopher finds so revolting. "
I took Hitchens in the broadest and most charitable sense. Meaning, all forms of totalitarianism (including North Korea). Yes, we are all slaves and servants to something. Either directly to God, or indirectly (or directly) to Satan whenever we are slaves to (or on account of) our sins like pride, money, power, etc.
"Humans can't even control their own thoughts. "
I specifically distinguished between mere thoughts and the choice to relish in those thoughts. We have wills whereby we can choose to focus our thoughts on different objects. Also, the Bible teaches that we are all sinners, and that unregenerate humans (i.e. non-Christians) are especially slaves to sin. So, your admission that some people can't control their thoughts indirectly supports my earlier claim that we are all slaves to someone or some thing. In the Calvinist theological tradition that I belong to, we believe in four stages of human conditions. That 1. before the Fall humans were able to sin or not sin; 2. after the Fall humans were only able to sin; 3. after becoming Christians are able to to sin or not sin; and 4. after entering heaven and being glorified not able to sin.
"You're only answer to human and animal suffering is to say "God is mysterious." If that does it for you, that does it for you. "
It wasn't my intention to be exhaustive in my blogpost as to why God allows evil and suffering. I included a link to Craig's videos on the topic to supplement. Even then, Craig isn't a Calvinist like myself so I would have some differences with him, along with have more to say on the topic that's distinctively Calvinistic. I've addressed the topic in other blogposts and the comboxes of other people's blogs. It's not like the Calvinist answers are a secret. They are just either unwanted or unknown (often because unwanted and therefore uninvestigated).
" The fight for justice comes in the only life we know we have. In the here and now. "
As a Christian I too believe that we ought to fight for justice and against injustice in this Age as well. However, there are some cases of injustice that cannot be solved in this Age, and take the next Age for resolution.
"Also, given a naturalistic view of life on earth, there is no mystery why evil occassionally triumphs. It is the result of humans being merely evolved primates. It is what you would expect to happen with no one at the controls. "
Christianity (IMO) is consistent with macro-evolution. God could have used macro-evolution (though the scientific evidence makes me doubt it). Nevertheless if there is no God, then it would appear that there are no objective values and so no intrinsic rights and wrong. Things just ARE, and things just HAPPEN; without any transcendent rightness or wrongness about it. Given atheism, it would seem that choosing to murder and rape are really no different than choosing to eat pizza with pineapple. Moreover, given atheism it seems likely that Eliminative Materialism is true and that human consciousness, thoughts, beliefs, desires, feelings, choices, deliberations, intentionality, ratiocination, and acts of will aren't real but are all illusory.
"Christianity posits and all loving and powerful God at the controls, but he doesn't see to give a shit. He may in fact enjoy it. The poor apologists only answer is "God moves in mysterious ways."
BTW, I don't agree with the common understanding/definition of "omnibenevolence". I'll probably update my blogpost to make that (and other things) clearer. Saying it doesn't seem that God cares is not the same thing as saying God doesn't care or that one has proof that God doesn't care. Jumping from it "SEEMS" that God doesn't care to "therefore I shouldn't or don't want to believe in God" is a logical non-sequitur. It's literally a babyish/childish response. When one weighs the potential eternal (future) and temporal (contemporary) benefits of belief in God and the poor evidence that God definitely doesn't exist or definitely doesn't care, a more sensible position to take is, maybe God exists and therefore I'll tentatively believe in God and maybe I'll find the true God in one of the religions out there. But because of our inherent sinfulness, many people would rather risk it all for the sake of the limited sense of freedom one gets by rejecting God or belief in God. Pascal's Wager was never meant to be a good argument for the *existence* of God, but for *belief* in or (even tentative/provisional belief) in God.
As I said above, I'll likely further edit my blogpost. I already did about an hour after I first posted it. I felt I was a bit too harsh towards Hitchens, so I toned it down a bit. I acknowledged his intelligence, but then said that on the specific topic of God and theology he wasn't deeply read/informed.
Jim wrote:
// I said that he said it was the Christian claim that it was (only?) for the downtrodden/weak. //
Umm, yeah, he didn't say that. He was riffing off the moderator.
//Yes,
we are all slaves and servants to something. Either directly to God, or
indirectly (or directly) to Satan whenever we are slaves to (or on
account of) our sins like pride, money, power, etc.//
Yeah,
I don't buy the God you believe in or the existence of Satan. I have
weaknesses, that's for sure. What would you expect when one is an
evolved primate? But to equate different drives to being a slave is
pretty ridiculous.
//I specifically distinguished between mere thoughts and the choice to relish in those thoughts.//
So,
if I think, in my mind, that my neighbor has a nice ass, and do admire
it from time to time. One might say "relish" it, but never, ever act on
it or DREAM of acting on it. That's a no no??
//So,
your admission that some people can't control their thoughts indirectly
supports my earlier claim that we are all slaves to someone or some
thing.//
How the hell does that even follow? No one
can fully control their thoughts. If I say, "Pig"! Did you have any
control over visualizing a "pig" in your mind??? Oink oink!!
//In the Calvinist theological tradition that I belong to...//
The one where you are predestined? Where you've no real control over your fate before YHWH? That tradition?
//However, there are some cases of injustice that cannot be solved in this Age, and take the next Age for resolution.//
What
kind?? We may not able to solve them, like the Jews incinerated while
your God watched, but that doesn't me it was impossible. By the way,
don't you believe, as a Calvinist, all those Jews are in Hell?
//Christianity (IMO) is consistent with macro-evolution. //
Sure, if you throw out the Bible and consider JEsus a liar/mistaken, and also one that died for a metaphor. Hoo boy!
//Things just ARE, and things just HAPPEN; without any transcendent rightness or wrongness about it.//
Correct
as it pertains to natural disasters. Irma happened. It makes total
sense given the nature of our planet. On theism? Not so much.
//Given
atheism, it would seem that choosing to murder and rape are really no
different than choosing to eat pizza with pineapple.//
For
some people, we call them sociopaths and psychopaths, that is true.
Funny, are they made in God's image? For a person with an evolved
primate morality, it isn't. To behave in that manner our species
wouldn't be here today for us to have this conversation.
J//umping
from it "SEEMS" that God doesn't care to "therefore I shouldn't or
don't want to believe in God" is a logical non-sequitur.//
Huh?
Who the hell said that? I do find the God of Abraham, Isaac, and
Joseph, one not worthy of worship. Actually a despicable character.
Thank goodness it's only a character from the minds of our forbears that
didn't know the earth orbited the Sun!!
//Pascal's
Wager was never meant to be a good argument for the *existence* of God,
but for *belief* in or (even tentative/provisional belief) in God.//
Pascal
treats God like a fool, or more like a Donald Trump like person in
bizarre need of affirmation from people that don't actually have their
heart or mind in it.
//Umm, yeah, he didn't say that. He was riffing off the moderator.//
Making the observation that Hitchens (whom I'll sometimes call CH) was riffing off the moderator doesn't alter the fact that Hitchens was alluding to the fact that many Christians make some claim about the special relationship between Christianity and the poor. This is a common claim that CH would have known, and I charitably interpreted him as misspeaking rather than strawmanning the Christian claim.
//Yeah, I don't buy the God you believe in or the existence of Satan.//
// But to equate different drives to being a slave is pretty ridiculous.//
Obviously you don't believe in God or Satan. I was explaining what we Christians mean by what you yourself alluded to so that you could better understand it and see how it makes internal sense in our worldview.
//So, if I think, in my mind, that my neighbor has a nice ass, and do admire it from time to time. One might say "relish" it, but never, ever act on it or DREAM of acting on it. That's a no no?? //
Christianity doesn't preclude or see as sin the appreciation of beauty. That's different from sins like lust; sins like ill-contentment with God's providence in not providing X and either not providing non-X (e.g. no wife at all) or providing Y (e.g. less attractive or older wife); or sins like planning and scheming on using psychology in subtle ways to seduce the woman (or man) to voluntarily commit the sin of fornication or adultery.
//How the hell does that even follow? No one can fully control their thoughts. If I say, "Pig"! Did you have any control over visualizing a "pig" in your mind??? Oink oink!! //
That's a strawman representation of what I said. I never claimed absolute control over one's thoughts. We all know the old point that if someone shouted aloud "Pink elephant!" most people would spontaneously and involuntarily think of a pink elephant. When it comes to human psychology and consciousness there are various aspects. For example, thoughts, beliefs, desires, acts of the will, feelings, deliberations, decisions, intentionality, ratiocinations. We can choose to direct our thoughts and foci ("focus" in the plural) on either good or evil. But often our natures (whether good or evil) have desires that overrule our wills so that we focus mostly on evil (or good). Calvinists like myself believe that non-Christians are Totally Depraved. We don't believe non-Christians are as bad as they can/could be (that's *UTTER depravity*). But total depravity says that all aspects of unregenerate human nature (including the mind, will, affections/desires, feelings etc.) is so affected by sin and evil that everything they do/think/believe/feel (etc.) is tainted by sin and evil desires so that there's a natural aversion and hostility toward the Christian God and Christianity. In my original comment I specifically talked about our "wills" and our ability to choose our "focus", but instead you strawman my position. I could say more about the Christian doctrines of Christian and non-Christian psychology, but the above should be sufficient for now.
//The one where you are predestined? Where you've no real control over your fate before YHWH? That tradition?//
You speak as if that's some kind of answer that should shut us up because we have no answers. Calvinists have been addressing such objections for over 400 years. Calvinism is a form of Augustinianism and Augustinian predestinarians have been addressing such objections for over 1,6000 years. True, in Calvinism God is ultimately in control of our destinities, but He ordains both Ends AND ***MEANS***. One of the means by which what He has foreordained will happen actually happens is our willing decisions to focus on or away from spiritually good (or evil) things. Given Calvinism our choices are real, they matter and make a difference [Calvinists usually reject libertarian free will for compatibilist free will]. So/therefore, one may not legitimately use predestination or election as an excuse to not seek God or for why they were lost.
For an introduction on how we can be morally responsible to the Calvinist conception of God see Paul Manata's introduction:
//What kind?? We may not able to solve them, like the Jews incinerated while your God watched, but that doesn't me it was impossible. By the way, don't you believe, as a Calvinist, all those Jews are in Hell?//
I don't know what you mean by "what kind?" I can't understand your second sentence either because of the grammatical mistake (I make such mistakes too, so no problem). I'll try and guess what your point(s) is(are). Yes, that's exactly right. Given atheism there is no way you can grant justice to the Jews who died at Hitler's hand. You say, "...like the Jews incinerated while your God watched..." Well, even some Jews (including rabbis) believe that God allowed the holocaust/Shoah as a punishment for Jewish sins. I think there's some truth to that, but not the whole truth. Since none of those Jews were equally guilty. Some were less guilty and more innocent than others. I already addressed your claim that God watched with indifference. I also pointed to my other blogposts that address it tangentially, and pointed to William Lane Craig's videos on the Problem of Evil and Suffering. Here's the link to my blogpost again. I've added an extra self-contained single video (43 minutes) in addition to the three successive lectures that amount to 3 1/2 hours: http://misclane.blogspot.com/2017/05/the-problem-of-evil-by-william-lane.html
None of your objections based on the Problem of Evil & Suffering even take into account the basic answers that Craig gives (even though Craig isn't even a Calvinist). So, you're not even at level 2 yet (much less level 3). So, I don't feel the need to exhaustively address your uninformed and mistaken objections.
//By the way, don't you believe, as a Calvinist, all those Jews are in Hell?//
Some of those Jews believed in the Gospel, so they would have gone to heaven. Contrary to most Calvinists, I'm open to the possibility of post-mortem salvation for some. God could have unilaterally and sovereignly saved some of those Jews. I don't dogmatically hold it, or positively believe some are saved this way. But I don't bar the possibility altogether either. I think that's more consistent with the doctrine of God's Sovereignty [not to mention the doctrine of God's mercy]. See the book, "Four Views on Salvation in a Pluralistic World" in the Zondervan counterpoint series. I don't believe that anyone dying presently goes to Gehenna. During the intermediate state the unsaved go to sheol/hades where they await future Gehenna. Whenever anyone does (eventually) go to hell/Gehenna, they do so for their own sins. No one innocent or not guilty goes to hell. God will never unjustly send anyone to hell.
//Sure, if you throw out the Bible and consider JEsus a liar/mistaken, and also one that died for a metaphor. Hoo boy! //
That's just SOOOOO ignorant that it's pitiful and sad. I'm not gloating at all. I'm sincerely sorry and pity you that you're so uninformed. See Craig's 21 lectures on the topic of Creation and Evolution. I've linked to it here: http://misclane.blogspot.com/2017/08/william-lane-craig-on-creation-and.html
You act as if Christians have never encountered your basic objections before, or haven't addressed them in depth. Like Hitchens, you're suffering from self-reinforced ignorance. That's why you can be so confident in your objections as if they're earth shatteringly new or devastating. There is no explicit contradiction between macro-evolution and the Bible, Christianity, the New Testament, the Gospel's, or Jesus' statements.
// It makes total sense given the nature of our planet. On theism? Not so much. //
//For some people, we call them sociopaths and psychopaths, that is true.//
Given theism, teleology makes sense and so can account for disease. That is, something contrary to design and proper functioning. Given atheism, there are no diseases. Things just are. There is no design or teleology and therefore there's no such thing as disfunctional cells, systems organs (whether Cancer etc.). As Hume said you can't get an "Ought" (or "Ought Not') from an "Is".
// Funny, are they made in God's image?//
"Funny" how you're also ignorant of the corollary associated doctrine of the Fall of Man and it's effects on human nature, its noetic effects and the bent toward sinfulness and tendency toward sickness.
// For a person with an evolved primate morality, it isn't. To behave in that manner our species wouldn't be here today for us to have this conversation. //
It doesn't ground morality to say that pragmatically if we didn't evolve to have some social behavior we wouldn't be here. Also, some primate species are more war-like while others are more altruistic and irenic. Who's to say that humans (or individuals within humanity) aren't evolving or may not evolve to be more war-like? Given atheism, it seems there is no basis for any distinction between appropriate or inappropriate behavior (i.e. no metaphysical/ontological grounding for objective values and morality) or evolution.
// I do find the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Joseph, one not worthy of worship.//
While there were Josephs who believed in YHVH, the grouping is usually "Abraham, Isaac and ***JACOB***" [Father, son and grandson].
//Actually a despicable character. //
Unless and until you ground objective morality, you can't objectively judge the Christian God as despicable. All you can say is your dislike the Christian God like some people dislike vegetables. It's a preference statement, not a real indictment on God's character that could be taken seriously.
//Thank goodness it's only a character from the minds of our forbears that didn't know the earth orbited the Sun!! //
Scientists don't believe in **absolute** HELIOcentrism, they believe in **relative** heliocentrism. In fact, many of the greatest scientists have pointed out that **relative** GEOcentrism is just as legitimate as relative heliocentrism. See my collection of quotations by great scientists on the subject here: http://quotesandreferences.blogspot.com/2016/08/quotes-in-favor-of-geocentrism.html
So, your statement about not knowing the earth orbits around the sun is LITERALLY FALSE. Since the General Theory of Relativity requires all motion to be relative, that therefore means relative geocentrism is a perfectly acceptable scientific position to hold.
Stephen Hawking wrote:
"So which is real, the Ptolemaic or Copernican system? Although it is not uncommon for people to say that Copernicus proved Ptolemy wrong, that is not true...one can use either picture as a model of the universe, for our observations of the heavens can be explained by assuming either the earth or the sun to be at rest."- Physicist, Stephen Hawking
//Pascal treats God like a fool, or more like a Donald Trump like person in bizarre need of affirmation from people that don't actually have their heart or mind in it.//
That's patently ridiculous. Pascal affirmed the aseity of God. That God doesn't need creation (much less the accolades and devotion of fawning creatures). God isn't egotistically vain in that way. God rightfully demands/deserves/desires our devotion because of Who and What He is, as well as on account of the fact that He knows it's for our own good. God knows He is the sources of all goodness, and everlasting goodness at that. For God to not require us to love Him would be unloving, unkind and hateful on His part. Imagine billionaire parents who are neutral on whether their children should look to them for their well being instead of the child's own feeble resources out in the cold outer darkness and wilderness.
I've spent a lot of time already in conversation with you. I have other things I need to attend to. So, you can have the last words. Thanks for the conversation. I'll add your comments to my blogpost. Though, I may eventually decide to respond to them on the blogpost. Thanks again for the conversation.
Jim wrote:
[Annoyed Pinoy], this
is FB. All you've done with your blogpost and posts above is
regurgitate Christian apologetics. Each one I could discuss, and show
you why they are fallacious and created as rear guard actions. Craig
himself admits the arguments are all beside the point, and one need only
to rely on the inner witness.
Apologists are truly akin to press secretaries for God. Just keep spinning.
Have a nice day!
Jim once again strawman's Craig. Craig does not say that arguments are beside the point. That may be Jim's interpretation of Craig's position and what it boils down to, but that is not Craig's point. In fact, Craig specifically states that arguments and evidences in Apologetics are useful even if they aren't not absolutely necessary. See Craig's video:
[Annoyed Pinoy],
Craig's point boils down to "God is mysterious, no one knows the mind
of God." Do you disagree? Also, if all you are going to do is post
links, and not directly engage, bother not. Have a great rest of the
week yourself!
You
apparently didn't watch the videos because Craig specifically said it
was NOT an appeal to Mystery, but to our finitude and limited epistemic
status.Part
of the reason I post links is to demonstrate that your comments are
ignorant of what Apologists have said. Since, you don't anticipate our
responses or even factor in our responses in your objections. As if
you're completely ignorant of them.
Jim wrote:
[Annoyed Pinoy],
our finitude and evolved primate nature make "God" a mystery to us!
Craig posits that God must have a reason for allowing bone cancer in
children, he just doesn't know it. It is absolutely punting to "Who can
know the mind of God".^^^ all of which makes YHWH a mysterious to humans.
I don't deny that there are mysterious aspects to God or God's ways. As
a Van Tillian presuppositionalist I believe in the reality and use of
the concepts of mystery and paradox (contrary to Clarkian
presuppositionalists). What I denied is that Craig (who holds to
Classical apologetics) claimed that his responses were an appeal to
mystery. Rather he was pointing out the limits of our intellectual
ability and capacity. Craig pointed to Chaos Theory and the butterfly
effect. If you can't predict how the flapping of a butterfly's wings
will affect the weather on the other side of the planet 100 years from
now, why assume you can understand all the reasons God has for allowing
any particular instance of suffering or evil? You can't. For you to deny
this basic reality is to expect more from yourself as a finite creature
than is possible. Craig's statements as a Classical apologist works as
far as it goes and I can agree with much of it as a
Presuppositionalist.
// ^^^ all of which makes YHWH a mysterious to humans.//
Even
though God hasn't revealed *ALL* the reasons for why He allows some
evils & suffering that doesn't alter the fact that God has revealed
*SOME* of the reasons why He does. If you're so knowledgeable about what
Christians and Calvinists believe, then go ahead and list some of the
reasons that God HAS revealed why He allows some evils in the world. Why
should I do you own homework for you when you're claiming to have done
it?
// Also, if all you are going to do is post links, and not directly engage, bother not.//
When
you give vague accusations of contradictions, it's perfectly fine for
me to post links. For example, you didn't show any explicit
contradiction between macro-evolution and Jesus' statements. I don't
personally believe in macro-evolution, but I don't see any explicit
contradiction between the two. Since you're making the claim, the burden
of proof is on you to show the irreconcilable contradiction. Moreover,
you're going to have to show that contradiction in light of (i.e.
factoring in) what Christians have said (e.g. what Craig has said on the
topic in his 21 lecture series on Creation and Evolution). http://misclane.blogspot.com/2017/08/william-lane-craig-on-creation-and.html
Jim wrote:
[Annoyed Pinoy],
thanks for admitting that Craig is at bottom a presup. without that
first move you'd be more than justified in supposing there is no one at
the wheel, or there is, and that deity is a sick bastard.
Jesus states that the scriptures (the OT) are
true in all respects. The OT contains Genesis. All of the major bits
of which are in error. Unless you posit God blinked everything into
existence 6,000 years ago to make everything look old.
//...thanks for admitting that Craig is at bottom a presup.//
Nothing in what I said implies that Craig is a presuppositionalists or a crypto-presuppositionalists. Just because there's overlap between the two doesn't mean that the overlap only makes sense within presuppositionalism. That's ridiculous and a non-sequitur. Just because Democrats and Republicans agree on X doesn't mean that it only belongs to one party.
//without that first move you'd be more than justified in supposing there is no one at the wheel, or there is, and that deity is a sick bastard. //
Why would *I* be justified or want to say that there's no one at the wheel? That doesn't make sense.
//Jesus states that the scriptures (the OT) are true in all respects.//
I agree. The question is in what sense are they true? How were they meant to be interpreted? Craig and other conservative and liberal scholars go into all this.
//The OT contains Genesis. All of the major bits of which are in error.//
You're assuming specific types of interpretation that you haven't justified. Once again, you haven't factored in what scholars like Craig have said in regard to the interpretation of Genesis. You just think you know it. That you can "wing it" without actually reading or informing yourself concerning what Christians and Jews have variously said or interpreted these passages to mean over the course of 2000 years.
As Craig has pointed out, Christians have interpreted Genesis is a whole host of ways. See for example:
I'm open to various interpretations of Genesis. The one I currently and tentatively hold to is something similar (generally speaking) to Hugh Ross' interpretation.
//Unless you posit God blinked everything into existence 6,000 years ago to make everything look old.//
Given modern physics (esp. quantum physics), I wouldn't be surprised if Quantum Idealism is true. In which case, these scientific debates are ultimately irrelevant.
The first video is a lecture by Bruce Gordon that might be too in-depth for you. So, I recommend videos 2, 3 and 4 as introductions to Quantum idealism.
In the Middle Ages, questions were raised about the propriety of
thinking that the atonement of Jesus was made necessary by some abstract
law of the universe that required God’s justice to be satisfied. This
gave rise to the so-called Ex Lex debate. In the Ex Lex debate, the question was raised as to whether God’s will functioned apart from any law or outside of any law (ex lex),
or whether the will of God was itself subjected to some norm of
righteousness or cosmic law that God was required to follow and,
therefore, His will was exercised under law (sub lego). The question was: Is God apart from law or is He under law?
The church’s response to this dilemma was to say basically “a pox on
both houses,” and to declare that God is neither apart from law nor
under law in these respective senses. Rather, the church responded by
affirming that God is both apart from law and under law, in so far as He
is free from any restraints imposed upon Him by some law that exists
outside of Himself. In that sense, He is apart from law and not under
law. Yet at the same time, God is not arbitrary or capricious and works
according to the law of His own nature. The church declared that God is a
law unto Himself. This reflects not a spirit of lawlessness within God,
but that the norm for God’s behavior and God’s will is based on what
the seventeenth-century orthodox theologians called “the natural law
of God.”
- R.C. Sproul [source]
Anyway, I think John Frame's assessment of Clark's famous theodicy is
helpful. Here it is. Frame's own footnotes are included in braces {and faint type}:
[Clark's] argument is that God is ex lex,
which means "outside of the law." The idea is that God is outside of or
above the laws he prescribes for man. He tells us not to kill, yet he
retains for himself the right to take human life. Thus, he is not
himself bound to obey the Ten Commandments or any other law given to man
in Scripture. Morally, he is on an entirely different level from us.
Therefore, he has the right to do many things that seem evil to us, even
things which contradict Scriptural norms. For a man to cause evil
indirectly might very well be wrong, but it would not be wrong for God. {But
on this basis, it would also not be wrong for God to cause evil
directly. That is why I said this argument makes the indirect-cause
argument beside the point.} Thus Clark neatly finesses any argument against God's justice or goodness.
There
is some truth in this approach. As we shall see, Scripture does forbid
human criticism of God's actions, and the reason is, as Clark implies,
divine transcendence. It is also true that God has some prerogatives
that he forbids to us, such as the freedom to take human life.
Clark
forgets, however, or perhaps denies, the Reformed and biblical maxim
that the law reflects God's own character. To obey the law is to imitate
God, to be like him, to image him (Ex. 20:11; Lev. 11:44-45; Matt.
5:45; 1 Peter 1:15-16). There is in biblical ethics also an imitation of
Christ, centered on the atonement (John 13:34-35; Eph. 4:32; 5:1; Phil.
2:3ff.; 1 John 3:16; 4:8-10). Obviously, there is much about God that
we cannot imitate, including those prerogatives mentioned earlier. Satan
tempted Eve into seeking to become "like God" in the sense of coveting
His prerogatives (Gen. 3:5). {John Murray said
that the difference between the two ways of seeking God's likeness
appears to be a razor's edge, while there is actually a deep chasm
between them.} But the overall holiness, justice, and goodness of God is something we can and must imitate on the human level.
So
God does honor, in general, the same law that he gives to us. He rules
out murder because he hates to see one human being murder another, and
he intends to reserve for himself the right to control human death. He
prohibits adultery because he hates adultery (which is a mirror of
idolatry—see Hosea). We can be assured that God will behave according to
the same standards of holiness that he prescribes for us, except
insofar as Scripture declares a difference between his responsibilities
and ours.
{Oddly, Clark, who is usually
accused of being a Platonic realist, at this point veers into the
opposite of realism, namely, nominalism. The extreme nominalists held
that the biblical laws were not reflections of God's nature, but merely
arbitrary requirements. God could have as easily commanded adultery as
forbidden it. I mentioned this once in a letter to Clark, and he
appreciated the irony, but did not provide an answer. Why, I wonder,
didn't he deal with moral law the same way he dealt with reason and
logic in, e.g., The Johannine Logos (Nutley, N.J.: Presbyterian
and Reformed, 1972)? There he argued that God's reason/logic was neither
above God (Plato) nor below God (nominalism), but God's own rational
nature. Why did he not take the same view of God's moral standards?}
[From: Apologetics to the Glory of God (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1994), 166-68.]
Frame concludes that Clark's ex lex defense "simply is not biblical." I think he's right.
[source]
I
think the above quotes are in keeping with the view that some modern
Christian theologians/philosophers/apologists hold and sometimes call "Divine
Command Essentialism" (William Lane Craig being one of the more popular
proponents who actually uses that term). It seems to combine the advantages and eliminate the
disadvantages of Divine Essentialism alone (simpliciter) and Divine Voluntarism alone (simpliciter).
On the one hand...
In Latin the word voluntas means "will."
One of the main and most discussed problems with Divine Voluntarism
(which is commonly expressed in the most common versions of the Divine Command Theory of morality
[DCT]) is that it would make God's moral commands arbitrary. God could
have theoretically assigned murder, rape and theft as virtues since on
divine voluntarism what God wills and commands is the reason why some
things are "good" and "right" while other things are "wrong" and "evil."
On the other hand...
One of the problems of Divine Essentialism on a Christian perspective is that it doesn't seem to a account for some Divine commands in the Bible that
do seem to be arbitrary and wouldn't necessarily flow from God's nature.
For example, the dietary laws in the Old Testament. Most Christian
theologians/apologists would agree that they were given for multiple
purposes. One of those purposes was to teach the Israelites how God
separated and consecrated them from all other gentile nations. By giving
the dietary laws in the Old Testament that distinguished between clean
and unclean meats as He did, God was teaching the Israelites to see
themselves as the consecrated people that they were. In that sense all
of God's laws reflect and are grounded in God's nature and authority.
However, those dietary laws were in some sense arbitrary and don't
necessarily flow from God's nature/essence. There's nothing
intrinsically evil or contrary to God's nature in swine. That's why such
Old Covenant laws were able to be abrogated (or at least superceded) by
the New Covenant laws and principles so that it's now permissible
(though not required) to eat foods that were formerly considered unclean
under the Old Covenant. Similar to how the principles of aerodynamics
supercede the law of gravity. While other Old Covenant laws (which were
typological) were fulfilled in Jesus Christ (the antitype).
Another
problem with Divine Essentialism is that God sometimes gives commands
which seem prima facie to contradict God's nature of love. For example,
God's command to Abraham to sacrifice his only son.
Additionally,
if one is a Calvinist, simple Divine Essentialism would seem to conflict with (or even contradict) the Calvinist understanding of reprobation (see my related
blog HERE).
Divine
Command Essentialism (DCE, not to be confused with ordinary DCT) holds that values and virtues flow from God's nature, while
our moral duties as God's creatures flow from His will as they are expressed in His commands to us. Yet in some sense they also reflect God's nature/essence. It (DCE) seems to be a synthesis of both divine essentialism and divine voluntarism. Such a view 1. affirms God as the standard and paradigm of virtue and goodness [possessing all moral virtues to their highest degree], 2. exonerates God from being arbitrary, 3. allowing for (and accounting for) God's ability to act and command in
ways that don't obviously or directly flow from God's nature or essence , and 4. nevertheless grounding God's commands in God's nature such that in some sense they always reflect that good nature.
A common objection to God being the standard of goodness is that it's actually not saying anything. It's a tautology. It's circular because all you're really saying is "God's nature is that
which is God's nature" or " God is being God-like." But that objection is like asking the question, "What's north of the north pole?" Or, "Why is a bachelor and unmarried man?" The north pole is north by definition, just like bachelors are unmarried men by definition. The reason why we have a moral sense in the first place is because God implanted it within us by making us in His moral and rational image. To question God being the standard of goodness is to assume morality and goodness exist outside of God. It is to beg the question [i.e. circular reasoning] about the source of goodness and morality. Unless and until a better explanation is offered for the source of morality and goodness one cannot even begin to judge, evaluate or object to God's being the standard and source of goodness and morality.
It might be asked, "If our moral sense comes from God, why do many of God's commands in the Bible seem to contradict our moral intuitions?" One of the reasons is because we're applying to God moral categories and duties that we have toward creatures to God. As William Lane Craig said,
But then what about God's command to Abraham to sacrifice his son
Isaac? Did God have the right to command such a thing and was Abraham
morally obligated to obey? I am inclined simply to bite the bullet and
say, "Yes, God did have the right and Abraham was so obligated." The
uncomfortableness of this answer can perhaps be mitigated by the
realization that God has the right to do certain things that would be
immoral for a human person to do on his own initiative. For example, I
do not have the right to kill another innocent person. But God, as the
author and giver of life, has that prerogative. If He should choose to
strike me dead right now, that is His right. (Notice how opponents of
capital punishment, for example, will often say to its proponents, "Who
do you think you are to play God?") Thus, Abraham would not have the
right on his own initiative to take Isaac's life, for that would be
murder. But if God should command Abraham to take Isaac's life, then the
situation is different because Abraham is now no longer acting on his
own but rather as the agent of God. God does not have the ability to
command Abraham to commit murder; but God does have the ability to
command Abraham to do something (viz., kill Isaac) which would have been murder had God not commanded it, i.e.,
if Abraham had undertaken the act on his own initiative in the absence
of a divine command. This seems to me to be a coherent solution to the
problem.
The case of Abraham and Isaac is, as I say, the exception
that proves the rule. God doesn't normally issue such extraordinary
commands, and so we should be highly sceptical of someone who says, "God
has commanded me to kill soandso!" I do not mean in Prof. Curley's
words that "normally God does not command us to do anything wrong; it's only occasionally
that he does that, as in the case of Abraham and Isaac." Rather I mean
that normally God doesn't command us to do anything which is such that, in the absence of a divine command, it would be morally wrong for us to do; the case of Abraham and Isaac is presented in Scripture as a highly unusual case.
I
do think that these same considerations are relevant for the case of
the destruction of the Canaanites at God's command. The Israeli armies
were acting as God's agents to carry out God's judgement upon
desperately corrupt nations which God had spared for 400 years until
their wickedness made them ripe for judgement. Later God would also
judge Israel by means of destruction by the pagan armies of Assyria and
Babylon. In commanding the Israeli army to utterly exterminate the
Canaanites, God was commanding them to do something, which in the
absence of a divine command, they would have had no right to do. God
had, however, morally sufficient reasons for issuing such an
extraordinary command, namely to preserve Israel from apostasy through
infection with Canaanite religion. Israel did not in fact obey God's
command, and as a result Israel did succumb repeatedly to apostasy,
which finally brought the judgement of God upon Israel itself. All of
this is admittedly very disconcerting, but it is a reminder that a holy
God may not pass comfortably into our modern Western concept of God as
the big Sugar Daddy in the sky.
These are difficult questions; but consider the alternative: moral nihilism.
One
has to eventually ask, "How can ultimate goodness be impersonal?" How
can goodness and morality be grounded in a materialistic worldview? Even
given Atheistic Moral Platonism
which posits immaterial forms or idea, these ideas aren't personal.
Positing Platonic forms may give one models for ideal behavior, but
since they aren't personal they cannot truly obligate. There are real
moral obligations and only persons can obligate us. If one agrees there
are universal obligations, then one ought also to agree that we are
obligated by a universal person, namely God. Causally effete abstract entities cannot obligate persons. Craig even questions whether atheistic moral Platonism is rationally coherent.
If God were really morally perfect and the very source of morality, then
it naturally follows that to disobey God is, by definition, immoral. God, being
the kind of Being God is, ought to be obeyed. That's an eminently rational reason
to obey God.
Is Atheistic Moral Platonism More Plausible Than Theism? (video link)
Divine
Command Essenatialism answers the Euthyphro Dilemma. Socrates wanted to know "the good" regardless of men or the gods thought. In Plato's
dialogues Socrates asked Euthyphro whether the pious (i.e. the holy or
the good) was beloved of the gods (and willed by them) because it was pious, or whether it
was pious/good because beloved by (and willed by) the gods. In modern times the question is often asked this way (especially by atheists); Is what God commands good because it is good, or is it good because God commands it? Among polytheists the question is especially problematic since the gods may disagree regarding which values and virtues have greater priority or which aren't values and virtues at all. For example, the god of war (Mars/Ares) may disagree with the god of love (Venus/Aphrodite). If the gods disagree, then the problem of subjectivity and competing views resurfaces even though Euthyphro originally appealed to the gods to overcome the subjectivity and moral relativism that exists among human beings.
In the context of Christian monotheism, if what God commands is good because it is good
then that would necessitate that there are absolutes outside of God.
Something which classic Christian theology would deny because it
conflicts with divine aseity. However, if what God commands is good merely because
God commands it on the basis of His sheer will, then that suffers from
the problem of divine voluntarism mentioned above. Namely, that God
could then theoretically assign things like murder, theft and rape as
"good" and even command them. Moreover, God could arbitrarily change his
commands in an inconsistent and contradictory way. Finally, God could
renege on His promises by making other contradictory promises and
commands.
Divine Command Essentialism seems to solve these problems and therefore should be considered a viable option for Christians to hold (even if not the only option). It also appears that Divine Command Essentialism seems to be best grounded in the
conception of God found in the Ontological argument for God's existence where God is defined as the greatest conceivable or possible being who possesses all perfections and excellencies to their highest and fullest degree. For example, great making properties like omnipotence, omniscience (all-knowing), omnisapience (all-wise), omnibenevolence (or moral perfection, if one is uncomfortable with the term "omnibenevolence") etc.
The following is a HIGHLY RECOMMENDED link
to William Lane Craig's Reasonable Faith podcast where he discusses
Divine Command Essentialism. Craig is not a Calvinist, but his
description of Divine Command Essentialism can be modified to fit in
with Calvinism.
According to my limited understanding, some of the church fathers and medieval theologians (being influenced by neo-Platonism for better or worse) sometimes argued that evil is the privation, negation and twisting of the good. Also, borrowing from the neo-Platonic scale/chain of being the "good" was related to that which is pure and perfect being (i.e. God who is pure being and actuality) while "evil" to that which tends towards non-being (potentiality and ultimately to nothingness). I suppose we can combine this insight with the ontological argument to argue for how all virtues and excellencies (in being and in character) meet at the top, namely in God. And that's another reason for why appeal to God's nature and character as the paragon/paradigm/exemplar of goodness isn't arbitrary.
This would help in response to atheistic arguments against God being the ultimate moral authority. For example atheistic arguments against appealing to the Imago Dei as another reason to argue for God being the exemplar of morality. Atheists have argued that on that view if people were created by Satan in Satan's image they would have a moral obligation to do as he instructed. However, given the ontological argument for God's existence then morality based on God's nature wouldn't be arbitrary because goodness is, by necessity, related to being. To perfect and supreme being, namely God who is the greatest conceivable and possible being.
For the sake of full disclosure I want to point out that some modern Christian apologists, theologians and philosophers don't limit the definition of evil to privation, negation and the twisting of the good. In fact, some reject that approach of defining evil altogether.