Evil God Challenge Revisited

 

I've addressed the Evil God Challenge BEFORE HERE. In a YouTube video thread, someone responded to me with the following:

yes, I have watched some debates over the "probabilistic or inductive version of the problem of evil".

And it seemed to me that there was no reason to favour the omnibenevolent god over the omnimalevolent god.

So the problem of evil is not "solved".

would you agree with that ?

With minor adjustments, the comments below was my response; with some added links to other of my blogs which couldn't be linked on YouTube.

I've watched those debates too. For example William Lane Craig's debate with Stephen Law, and Craig's debate [if I recall] with Peter Millican. I disagree with you for a number of reasons. I'll just list 5 off the top of my head which I should really organize and make more rigorous  and less repetitive. Among my goals includes showing no parity of argument. 

1. Evil is defined in various ways in the Christian tradition. A popular one is the one borrowed from Neo-Platonism. The concept later termed Privatio Boni. That evil is the privation/negation/twisting/corruption of the good. Evil has no positive ontological status. Analogous to how shadows are the lack/diminishment of light, or cold is of heat. There is no such THING as shadows or cold. A moth eaten dress with holes would be analogous to evil in creation. However, a perfectly evil "God" would result in no dress at all [no creation]. If taken to it's logical conclusion, then no God at all. Such a concept of a "perfectly" evil God is contradictory given perfect being theology [see below]. Contradictions, like a square circle, cannot exist. A perfectly evil God is conceptually incoherent. He would have to have some good and good intentions [see numbers 3, 4 and 5 below]. 

2. One would first need to define and metaphysically ground good/bad, right/wrong before one can launch the evil God challenge. Given Christianity, one can ground them. But it's unlikely that non-Christians can without borrowing from a Christian worldview [cf. presuppositional arguments], and therefore cannot do an *external* critique or alternative. If they launch an *internal* critique and alternative given Christian premises and presuppositions, then all we have to do is show that there is no internal inconsistency as well as show that employing such premises can't be used to launch the challenge.

3. The move W.L. Craig makes has some merit. Given perfect being theology, God by definition is good [the summum bonum and the ens perfectissimum], and therefore it makes no sense to posit an "Evil God" challenge, because by definition, such a being wouldn't be God. But, instead, a really powerful [or omnipotent] being, but not God. Though non-theists will think we theists will be cheating by defining God [to our advantage] in such a way that it precludes such a malevolent being from being God. Besides, whether you call it "God" or not, doesn't answer the logical possibility. True. So, one would have to say more than that. 

Given perfect being theology, such a perfectly rational being would not choose to be evil. It makes no rational sense for such an intelligent, all-knowing [omniscient] and all-wise [omnisapient] being to choose to be and promote evil. Wisdom is knowing the best means to arrive at the best ends, and choosing it. In the Christian tradition, it makes perfect sense that an omni-God who has all perfections to their high degree seeks as His goals, 1. to glorify Himself & make His glory known to creation for His own joy [without denying He was all-sufficiently satisfied and happy/blessed SANS creation, pace the "full bucket paradox"], 2. out of the overflow of His goodness/joy/happiness/blessedness to share His goodness and perfection with/to/through His creation. That's why the famous catechism's answer to the question, "What is the chief end [i.e. goal, purpose] of man?"  was "To glorify God and enjoy Him forever" [or as Piper famously suggested, BY enjoying Him forever]. What possible motive would an evil god have to promote evil? He's literally agent irrational in his goals and plans, and therefore not truly perfect or omnipotent. Destroying parity.

Since all of God's attributes are coupled with each other. God's omnipotence is coupled with wisdom. So, if the evil God is not all wise, then neither is he all powerful. This is especially true in versions of classical theism that affirm something like Thomistic divine simplicity whereby all God's attributes are one and the same thing, and not as we like to distinguish them into different attributes. Wiki says, //"In theology, the doctrine of divine simplicity says that God is without parts. The general idea can be stated in this way: The being of God is identical to the "attributes" of God. Characteristics such as omnipresence, goodness, truth, eternity, etc., are identical to God's being, not qualities that make up that being, nor abstract entities inhering in God as in a substance; in other words we can say that in God both essence and existence are one and the same."// Though, I'm sympathetic to simplicity, I'm not toward Thomistic versions of ABSOLUTE divine simplicity [ADS]. 

4. Along with privatio boni, evil has also been defined in the Christian tradition as that which violates one of more of the following 3 senses of God's will. God's 1. revealed will and/or 2. dispositional [heart] will, and/or 3. will of design [not including God's 4. decretive will, that always happens]. Such distinctions don't exist, or may not be able to exist in the "Evil God" because all his intentions are only evil. Given privatio boni, perfect being theology etc. it's difficult to explain how an "evil god" can or would maximize or optimize evil conceptually and then by execution.

[For more, see my blog post here: Distinctions in God's Will from a Calvinist Perspective] 

5. So, far all of the above need not require Calvinism [though all are compatible with it]. I'm a Calvinist. and Calvinism may have some moves which might help. Most Calvinists do not hold to divine voluntarism, though some do [though open, I'm inclined against it myself]. In fact, if any theological position would best fit with voluntarism [rather than say, divine essentialism etc.], Calvinism would be a prime candidate [despite John Calvin himself rejecting it]. Assuming NON-Christian divine voluntarism for the sake of argument, then there is no problem of the evil God challenge. God can arbitrarily choose, and then inform and command his creatures that things like rape, theft and murder as good. By such a voluntaristic conception of God, that God isn't evil. And so, there is no evil God by which to launch an "evil God challenge". But such an extreme form of voluntarism is contrary to the Christian conception of God, even a voluntaristic Christian version. 

See voluntarist Calvinist Vincent Cheung's book that's freely online, "The Author of Sin" [downloadable HERE]. The point I'm having difficulty expressing is that in some versions of CHRISTIAN divine voluntarism [Calvinistic or not] the evil God of the "Evil God challenge" is virtually indistinguishable, or at least significantly similar enough that the differences would seem to boil down to how this God optimizes/maximizes what we would term "evil" [despite them not being actually evil given that paradigm]. Since evil is defined by his volition, we cannot logically argue against such a God's behavior as being objectively evil. The Christian voluntaristic conception need only adjust the features so as to affirm that God's commands to His creatures are to love God, love oneself and love one's neighbor as attenuated by Biblical revelation. That better solves the problem.   Especially since it's in keeping with perfect being theology and agent rationality. For myself, I'm inclined to the mediating position between voluntarism and essentialism called Divine Command Essentialism. God is the good [Himself] and is the standard of goodness. Virtues are grounded in God's nature/essence [essentialism aspect] and God's commands for what's right and wrong to His creatures flow from His will/volition [voluntarism aspect] which are grounded in and reflect His good nature.

See also my blogposts:

The Evil God Hypothesis: Some Observations and Answers

God in Relation to Law: Ex Lex, Sub Lego or Sibi Ipsi Lex

Distinctions in God's Will from a Calvinist Perspective

Why Obey God?

The Evil God Hypothesis: Some Observations and Answers

A friend asked:

Hope you've been well!!!! Not sure if you've answered this already, but is it possible for a necessary being to be all-evil? I would think it's not. That only an all-good being can be a necessary being.

My response:

I agree. I could say more, but here's a succinct response to the challenge. I recommend William Lane Craig's debates against Peter Millican [or Here] and Stephen Law, and the times he has addressed this issue in his Question of the Week articles [e.g. #387, and #238] . See also his podcasts on the topic.

I. Presuppositionally, it seems to me that non-theists have a difficult (if not impossible) time making sense of objective good and evil. Therefore, unless and until non-theists rationally provide an independent standard or source of goodness (and therefore a basis for also identifying evil), they cannot launch the "Evil God Hypothesis" challenge as an **External** critique. It can only be an **Internal** critique. However, if Christian theism were shown to be internally consistent, then the "Evil God" challenge against Christianity would fail. And I don't see such internal contradiction.

II. There are different ways of defining "evil". I'll focus on one. One way Augustine did (which he borrowed from Platonism and Neoplatonism) was to see evil as privation, deviation, negation, twisting, defection [think defect], corruption [etc.] "from" or "of" the good and of being. In the Neoplatonic scale/chain of being, being was good, and non-being was evil. There's a Christian analog to that. God originally created all things good. However, evil is that which goes contrary to God's design and/or revealed will for the character of creatures. Evil has no independent existence and being. Evil is parasitic on the good. Evil doesn't have positive ontological reality/status. It's like coldness. It's the absence of heat (to some degree or another). Or a shadow, the absence of light (to some degree or another). An analogy would be like that of a perfect dress. If part of the dress were eaten by a moth, then that would be an "evil" in the dress (which could represent the world or some other being). A perfectly evil dress would be no dress at all because it has been completely eaten by moths. Similarly, a perfectly evil God would be no God (or any type of being) at all. Even the devil, who is arguably the most wicked of creatures has soon good qualities. Qualities that reflect God's original good creation and His communicable attributes. For example, the devil has personality and possesses extremely high intelligence. These are good things in themselves, but he harnesses them in a way contrary to God's revealed will for His creatures. In other words, the devil commits/does evil.
Concerning this paragraph, recall my blogposts:
http://misclane.blogspot.com/2013/11/distinctions-in-gods-will-from.html
http://misclane.blogspot.com/2014/05/god-in-relation-to-law-ex-lex-sub-lego.html

III. Steve Hays has addressed the Evil God challenge multiple times at Triablogue. One of his common points is that the issue is ultimately irrelevant. As Steve wrote in a YouTube comment:

//What argument in particular? The evil god hypothesis? That's just a poor man's version of the Cartesian demon........If the evil god existed, that would be a defeater for atheism no less than Christian theism, so assuming we're supposed to take that thought-experiment seriously, the onus lies on the atheist as much as the Christian. If the evil god exists, there's nothing anyone can do about it. Arguments are futile in that event. If the evil god doesn't exist, arguments are unnecessary in that regard.?//

In other words, if one were to take the Evil God Hypothesis seriously, then it would immediately become a moot point.

IV. I've shown above that a perfectly evil God couldn't exist ontologically. Some theists like William Lane Craig also argue that such a being couldn't exist given the definition of "God" and what's called "perfect being theology" in the theological and philosophical literature. Craig basically defines away the possibility of such an Evil God. Something that has some merit, but which wouldn't be very persuasive for non-theists (and especially anti-theists). In the Western theological and philosophical tradition since Anselm, God has often been defined as the greatest conceivable being, possessing all great making properties [in every possible world]. Such a Maximally Great Being would be morally perfect because moral perfection is one of those great making properties it would necessarily have and possess. Since an "Evil God" would purportedly be both a morally imperfect AND a morally perfect being at the same time and in the same sense, it's a contradictory concept, and contradictions are impossible. Therefore, such a being cannot possibly exist. Just as a Square Circle cannot exist. At most, there could only be a very evil and very powerful being, but that being couldn't be "God" or an "Evil God" [i.e. "God" as defined in the Ontological Argument or Anselmian way]. Let's call such a finite being who is very evil [but not perfectly evil], very intelligent [but not omniscient or omnisapient] and very powerful [but not omnipotent] an Evil god [lower case "g"]. Or, better yet, Very Evil Greatly Empowered Spirit [VEGES]. Incidentally, three year olds inherently dislike VEGES. Especially green ones.

V. Rationally a Very Evil Spirit [i.e. VEGES] doesn't make much sense. From the atheistic proponents of the Evil God Hypothesis [EGH] I understand that such a being would perform both good and evil things in such a way to maximize suffering, but that we wouldn't be able to tell from the percentages of evil and good that the being was either good or evil. The main point of the EGH is to undermine the evidence for the existence of God based on all the good we DO see in the world. Craig has pointed out that theists don't at all (or don't merely IMO) conclude that God is good based on an inductive survey of the balance of good and evil in the world. There are other evidences and arguments that support the existence of God (e.g. the Moral Argument, the Contingency Argument, the Kalam Cosmological Argument et al.). A proponent of EGH could argue that every evidence and argument for God could appear plausible to us only because the Evil God/Spirit/Cartesian Demon tampers with our brains to make us think they are plausible or valid or even sound. Such a powerful being could be tricking us to think that 2 + 2 = 4, when in actuality [ad arguendo] 4 is the wrong answer. If that's the case, then all argument is moot, as Hays pointed out.

But assuming at least some of our observations and ratiocinations are reliable, then an Evil Spirit [VEGES] doesn't make much rational sense. Such a being would seem to more likely create an unpredictable cartoonish world than the world that we actually observe; which is intricately structured, uniform, elegant, mathematical, consistent and apparently designed and finely-tuned. When we consider all of the physical sciences [e.g. physics, cosmology, cosmogony, chemistry etc.], it seems to me to be clear that if there was a very powerful being who created the world we live in it would have to be EXTREMELY intelligent. Yet, what possible motivation could such a very intelligent and rational being have for maximizing the evil or calamity or suffering in the world? Wouldn't such a being have enough of an ego and self-esteem so as to challenge itself to create something wonderful rather than awful? Making awful things is easy. idiots can do it. But making/creating wonderful things is hard. Executing the latter would be better for its self-esteem than the former since its creation(s) would be a reflection of its own nature and character. That's consistent with a maximally great being, viz. God. Though, admittedly it's conceivable that a finite Evil Spirit [VEGES] might have low self-esteem and so wreaks havoc on its creatures like a disturbed child who burns insects using a magnifying glass. But such petty behavior would seem to be beneath the dignity of a highly intelligent finite being [much less a maximally great one]. This makes some sense even if the Spirit doesn't intend for us to know it or worship it. However, were such a being to exist, it's also the case that there are other rational conscious agents which it created that can evaluate its creation, namely us human beings. Wouldn't such a being want to impress us with its power and wisdom [cf. Rom. 1:19-20ff.] instead of the lack of power and wisdom? How much more if it does want us to worship it? IF it WOULD want us to worship it for its moral perfections even though it secretly knows its own evil behavior, that would seem to lead to its Cognitive Dissonance. Intelligence usually prefers consistency over inconsistency. The consistency and uniformity we see in the physical world would imply an internal rational, existential and psychological consistency on the part of the creator/Creator that argues against the VEGES favoring, creating, planning and enjoying pointless evil and suffering.

VI. If a VEGES existed, then it would (IMO) likely NOT make the evidence for one religion greater than that for others. Yet, from my (admittedly) limited inductive research (and that of others whose research I stand on), the case for Christianity is much stronger than for other worldviews. If the religions of the world were inspired by the VEGES to confuse mankind, then why providentially make Christianity have a better apologetical case for it than (most or [apparently via induction] all) other worldviews? If that's true, then that tips the scales away from an VEGES. For at least two reasons. 1. There's independent evidence for the truth of Christianity and its specific God, as Craig has pointed out. So, that tips the scales away from and equal 50/50 balance. 2. Given EGH/VEGES, it's unlikely that any one theistic worldview would have better credentials. It's true that one could argue that the EG/VEGES could have providentially created the Christian religion for it to be worshipped (along with the other religions). But that suffers from at least two problems. 1. The Cognitive Dissonance I mentioned above. 2. The numbers of people who worship the Christian God, while consistent with Calvinism, is not so consistent with a being that wants to (nearly?) maximize belief and devotion to it from its creatures. Though, in all honesty, and to play the VEGES advocate, this is not strictly illogical/inconsistent. Especially since such a being could have created multiple worlds/universes, some of which have entire civilizations that uniformly worship it, so that of all rational creatures in the entire multiverse, only a small percentage of them don't worship it in one similar form [a form that intersects all universes but that's also dishonest since it doesn't accurately represent its true nature and character]. Or, given all civilizations in all universes, on average, there is no singular worldview that has better credentials. However, WE only have this world/globe to do an inductive investigation, and IMO Christianity does stand out better than the rest. Logical possibilities which we have no evidence for shouldn't automatically trump inductive observations.
See my blogpost here on a related topic:
http://misclane.blogspot.com/2017/08/the-problem-of-evil-brief-conversation.html

VII. Finally, the existence of Evil, if acknowledged and granted as a premise, suggests or even requires an ultimate Good. The Moral Argument for God's Existence (argued by many theists like William Lane Craig) has as its corollary the inference that evil (and evils) actually proves the existence of God. Theists have argued that objective evil can only exist in contrast to an objective standard of Good/Goodness. Such a standard is more plausibly personal than impersonal [see video below]. Therefore, if objective evil exists and can only exist if God [the maximally great being] exists, then God exists. In which case NEITHER the Evil God [of the EGH] or the Very Evil Greatly Empowered Spirit exist [since God does exist], and their Hypotheses fail as a challenge to theism and (IMO) especially Christian Theism.

Is Atheistic Moral Platonism More Plausible Than Theism?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VGWAVRoLQ3c

See also my blogposts:

Evil God Challenge Revisited

God in Relation to Law: Ex Lex, Sub Lego or Sibi Ipsi Lex

Distinctions in God's Will from a Calvinist Perspective

Why Obey God?