Divine Hiddenness: Gavin Ortlund's Response to Alex O'Connor

 

 

 

 Divine Hiddenness: My Response to Alex O'Connor
https://youtu.be/_d-6UhOS0FE

 

 My own blogposts on the topic:

Detecting and Finding God
https://gospelcrumbs.blogspot.com/2013/07/detecting-and-finding-god.html

"Unveiling" The Hiddenness of God
https://gospelcrumbs.blogspot.com/2013/07/the-hiddenness-of-god.html

 

 

 

 

 

Divine Hiddenness - Challenging Alex O'Connor's Doubts About God

 

The following is a ~12 minute clip of Jonathan McLatchie's response to the Hiddenness of God objection that Alex O'Connor gave in their debate.

 

Challenging Alex O'Connor's Doubts About God
https://youtu.be/GAyF906Vb00

 

 

 

 

One of Many Possible Calvinistic Approaches To the Problem of Evil

 

I recommend Vincent Cheung's materials with various qualification and caveats. I've expressed and listed some of my disagreements and agreements with Vincent Cheung in one of my blogs HERE. For example, I disagree with Cheung's tendency toward Hyper-Calvinism. Due to his Hyper-Calvinistic tendencies some of his solutions to the Problem of Evil will be difficult for many people to accept, including Calvinists. Nevertheless, he makes some great points in the following article. Some of his points I'm open to but don't dogmatically hold. They can be possible options as last ditch responses to the problem of evil. The more options Christians have in responding to the problem of evil from a Christian point of view, the more it demonstrates that the problem is not so problematic for Christianity.

So, I encourage people (especially my fellow Calvinists) to read his materials and add more tools into their apologetical tool box. Tools that won't be one's "go to" answers, but can function as alternative back-up and reserved answers. For example, most Calvinists appeal to compatibilism and deny occasionalism. Whereas Cheung thinks that's a mistake because the real question is whether humans have freedom relative to God. Given his understanding of occasionalism, no one has freedom relative to God, because God directly controls all things.

 

The Problem of Evil by Vincent Cheung
https://www.vincentcheung.com/2005/03/15/the-problem-of-evil/

 

 See Also his related book The Author of Sin which is also freely online.

Here's a quote from pages 20-21 of The Author of Sin which addresses the problem of evil.

 

The writers exercise remarkable restraint toward compatibilism. They have everything set
up well enough that they could blast it to smithereens, but they want to play nice. So they
settle for saying that Augustine's is a "dubious contribution," and that the deterministic
aspects of his philosophy "cancel out any meaningful application of the concept of free
will."
This means that if a compatibilist truly affirms divine determinism, then what he says about human "freedom" or "free will" is meaningless – it is nonsense. These writers see this – most Calvinists refuse to see it.

Summary
Here is the way to avoid nonsense:
1. Affirm absolute divine determinism.
2. Deny all human freedom.
3. Base moral responsibility on God's sovereign decree to judge mankind.
4. Answer almost all related objections by doing the following:
a. Affirm that God is just and righteous by definition.¹²
b. Deny the unjustified premise, "responsibility presupposes freedom."¹³

There is no twisting and turning, no philosophical gymnastics, and no need to redefine this
and qualify that. God is sovereign, man is not free – and there is no problem. This is
biblical, coherent, simple, and defensible.

Footnotes:
12 This renders all "problem of evil" and "author of sin" type of objections inapplicable.
13 This renders human freedom irrelevant to the discussion.

Did Satan's Fall Corrupt Nature?

 

Gavin Ortland addresses natural evil in light of the Fall of angels.

Did Satan's Fall Corrupt Nature?
https://youtu.be/p0G-3eFHeq8

Bad Arguments for the "Problem" of Evil---Greg Bahnsen

 

Bad Arguments for the "Problem" of Evil---Greg Bahnsen
https://youtu.be/T5QKwABjg5w

The above excerpt is from Greg Bahnsen's lectures series The Problem of Evil. All lectures can be downloaded for free at the link below:

The lecture series includes the following lectures:

GB248 Is the Problem of Evil Problematic?

GB249 Is God Good?

GB250 How to Defend the Faith in the Face of Evil

All three lectures can be freely downloaded at the following link:

https://www.cmfnow.com/mp3/apologetics

Just scroll down to the series titled, "The Problem of Evil"

God JUST IS the Standard of Goodness

See also my blogs:
God in Relation to Law: Ex Lex, Sub Lego or Sibi Ipsi Lex

Distinctions in God's Will from a Calvinist Perspective

God just *IS* the standard of what is good, by which everything else is compared. While it's an axiom and presupposition that God is the standard of goodness, there are also subsidiary reasons to think it makes sense and is the case. For example, if God knows all things [including all possibilities], then God know the best means to the best ends. God knows all possible consequences and outcomes to all possible decisions He or creatures could make. But then people will ask, how does God know, or learn or determine what is "best"? Well, that's based on God's perfect rationality. If God were perfectly rational, then he wouldn't be agent irrational. Rather He'd not only be omniscient [all-knowing] but also all wise [omnisapient]. In God's wisdom He knows that what is for His greatest glory is also for the greatest good of creation as a whole. Within those parameters God is free to create any world(s) He wishes. There may not be a single top world that's best. There may be a number of worlds, or even an infinite number of worlds that fit those criteria and parameters from which God could choose to create.

It might be argued that that conception would imply what is good is ultimately determined by consequences or state of affairs such that God really isn't the standard of goodness, but merely an observer and implementor of the good [i.e. the good is actually outside of God]. No, because the possibilities exist within God [His mind and powers]. There are no possibilities outside of God. Moreover, that might just be an analogy that might help others see why it can make some sense that God is the Good.

Another example of why it could be reasonable to think that God JUST IS the standard of goodness would be the Neo-Platonic insight that some Christian theologians like Augustine subscribed to which says that being just is goodness. Since God is pure uncreated and infinite Being, therefore God is pure uncreated infinite Goodness. Evil then would be defined as the sufficient privation/negation/absence/twisting/corruption of being or goodness [i.e. the principle of privatio boni]. 

As a Calvinist, I also think another aspect in determining what is evil is also by what violates God's 1. will of Demand [i.e. preceptive/prescriptive will which are His revealed commands], 2. God's will of Delight [i.e. God's gracious heart], 3. God's will of Design [e.g. cancer violates the original design of human biology], 4. God's will of Direction [i.e. a violation of God's supernaturally revealed specific will for someone]. Though, admittedly, from a Calvinist point of view God's 5. will of Decree ordains that the four above senses of God's will will sometimes be violated. Nevertheless, God doesn't ordain evil/sin/suffering for their own sake, or in isolation. He doesn't saction them in the sense of delighting in them. Yet He ordains them for other 2nd order goods that would not obtain if He didn't allow or ordain them to happen. Second order goods that will far outweigh the evil that is permitted/ordained such that God has morally and rationally sufficiently reasons to allow/ordain them.

Ultimately, God is the standard of Goodness due to His Sovereignty as the Supreme and Perfect Being [the ens perfectissimum and the summum bonum]. God just is the Arbiter of what is Good. But not in an arbitrary capricious way. God is a RATIONAL and Essential Arbiter of what is Good ["essential" in the sense of being = good]. That's why I hold ot Divine Command Essentialism rather than pure essentialism or pure voluntarism. God has eternally known His manifold perfections and excellencies and omnisciently and omnisapiently knows that He is the best possible Standard by which all creation ought to be modeled, evaluated and judged.

DEBATE: Would God Allow Evil? CosmicSkeptic vs InspiringPhilosophy

Being a Calvinist I wouldn't use all of the arguments that Michael Jones uses in this debate. Nevertheless, in my opinion Michael Jones won the debate. Though, Alex O'Connor did a pretty good job as well. Decide for yourself.

DEBATE: Would God Allow Evil? @CosmicSkeptic vs @InspiringPhilosophy

https://youtu.be/hNF9bTESZwE

See also this debate review:

Reviewing the @InspiringPhilosophy vs @CosmicSkeptic Debate on God and Evil

https://youtu.be/fHjlaA4Qp_Q

The Term and Concept of Omnibenevolence Is Apparently Recent

 

 

https://branemrys.blogspot.com/2011/07/omnibenevolence.html

Book Reviews of Why Is There Evil In The World (And So Much Of It)? by Greg Welty

By Steve Hays:
https://triablogue.blogspot.com/2018/05/why-is-there-evil-in-world-and-so-much_30.html

By James Anderson:
http://www.proginosko.com/2018/06/why-is-there-evil-in-the-world-and-so-much-of-it/

Atheistic Objection to "Thoughts & Prayers"

Recently it's been popular on social media to object to theists stating that their "thoughts & prayers" go out to the living victims of tragedy. Usually, this objection comes from simplistic atheists. The following meme is representative of their objection.

I got that meme from an atheistic Facebook group. The following is my response [with minor adjustments].

1. The apparent fact that the phrase "thought & prayers" instead of merely "prayers" has, from my observation, arisen after the emergence of aggressive atheism [cf. The New Atheism movement] suggests to me that that addition of "thoughts" to the simple term "prayers" was an attempt by non-theists and atheists to be included in wishing the living victims of tragedy well. Especially since, a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of most prayers are thoughts. You can have thought without prayer, but you usually don't have prayer without thought [I'm leaving aside the issue of speaking in tongues whereby one allegedly can pray without knowing what one is praying about because it's not pertinent to the issue]. Given theism, the statement "Our thoughts and prayers are for/with the victims" would tend to seem to be redundant. So, if there's any asininity to the phrase "thoughts & prayers", it might actually find its source in atheism, not theism.

2. Those who object to people saying they are praying for the living victims of tragedy on account of the [alleged] fact that praying doesn't do anything to help beg the question that it doesn't help. They would have to be omniscient to know all the various ways God might respond to prayer in the short term, long term, the spiritual, the physical, the emotional, the financial, the earthly, the heavenly [e.g. victims of tragedy might end up getting "saved" because of seeing their need for God]. So, if anything, it's objectors to praying and prayers who are potentially being unmerciful toward the victims. If the atheistic objectors point out that theists who pray don't also do something tangible in this physical world, so what? Not everyone (whether theist or atheist) can do something tangible or financial (etc.) about a situation. Since, hard atheism [positive belief in the non-existence of all possible gods], as opposed to soft atheism [mere lack of a belief in gods], is impossible to prove; the logical, rational and merciful thing is for soft atheists to tolerate [or even encourage] theists to pray for victims of tragedy. But many atheists would rather not be that logical or rational.

3. Also, what's wrong with thought? An atheist or theist could be spending some time thinking of the victims and later come to some insight into how he or she CAN **NOW** help the victims, and even possibly prevent future similar tragedies. Isn't that precisely what objectors to "Thoughts & Prayers" are attempting to do when they object? Namely, thinking. That is, unless they're willing to admit that they are being UNTHINKING when they make such asinine objections to " *̲T̲H̲O̲U̲G̲H̲T̲S̲*̲ & Prayers".

The Evil God Hypothesis: Some Observations and Answers

A friend asked:

Hope you've been well!!!! Not sure if you've answered this already, but is it possible for a necessary being to be all-evil? I would think it's not. That only an all-good being can be a necessary being.

My response:

I agree. I could say more, but here's a succinct response to the challenge. I recommend William Lane Craig's debates against Peter Millican [or Here] and Stephen Law, and the times he has addressed this issue in his Question of the Week articles [e.g. #387, and #238] . See also his podcasts on the topic.

I. Presuppositionally, it seems to me that non-theists have a difficult (if not impossible) time making sense of objective good and evil. Therefore, unless and until non-theists rationally provide an independent standard or source of goodness (and therefore a basis for also identifying evil), they cannot launch the "Evil God Hypothesis" challenge as an **External** critique. It can only be an **Internal** critique. However, if Christian theism were shown to be internally consistent, then the "Evil God" challenge against Christianity would fail. And I don't see such internal contradiction.

II. There are different ways of defining "evil". I'll focus on one. One way Augustine did (which he borrowed from Platonism and Neoplatonism) was to see evil as privation, deviation, negation, twisting, defection [think defect], corruption [etc.] "from" or "of" the good and of being. In the Neoplatonic scale/chain of being, being was good, and non-being was evil. There's a Christian analog to that. God originally created all things good. However, evil is that which goes contrary to God's design and/or revealed will for the character of creatures. Evil has no independent existence and being. Evil is parasitic on the good. Evil doesn't have positive ontological reality/status. It's like coldness. It's the absence of heat (to some degree or another). Or a shadow, the absence of light (to some degree or another). An analogy would be like that of a perfect dress. If part of the dress were eaten by a moth, then that would be an "evil" in the dress (which could represent the world or some other being). A perfectly evil dress would be no dress at all because it has been completely eaten by moths. Similarly, a perfectly evil God would be no God (or any type of being) at all. Even the devil, who is arguably the most wicked of creatures has soon good qualities. Qualities that reflect God's original good creation and His communicable attributes. For example, the devil has personality and possesses extremely high intelligence. These are good things in themselves, but he harnesses them in a way contrary to God's revealed will for His creatures. In other words, the devil commits/does evil.
Concerning this paragraph, recall my blogposts:
http://misclane.blogspot.com/2013/11/distinctions-in-gods-will-from.html
http://misclane.blogspot.com/2014/05/god-in-relation-to-law-ex-lex-sub-lego.html

III. Steve Hays has addressed the Evil God challenge multiple times at Triablogue. One of his common points is that the issue is ultimately irrelevant. As Steve wrote in a YouTube comment:

//What argument in particular? The evil god hypothesis? That's just a poor man's version of the Cartesian demon........If the evil god existed, that would be a defeater for atheism no less than Christian theism, so assuming we're supposed to take that thought-experiment seriously, the onus lies on the atheist as much as the Christian. If the evil god exists, there's nothing anyone can do about it. Arguments are futile in that event. If the evil god doesn't exist, arguments are unnecessary in that regard.?//

In other words, if one were to take the Evil God Hypothesis seriously, then it would immediately become a moot point.

IV. I've shown above that a perfectly evil God couldn't exist ontologically. Some theists like William Lane Craig also argue that such a being couldn't exist given the definition of "God" and what's called "perfect being theology" in the theological and philosophical literature. Craig basically defines away the possibility of such an Evil God. Something that has some merit, but which wouldn't be very persuasive for non-theists (and especially anti-theists). In the Western theological and philosophical tradition since Anselm, God has often been defined as the greatest conceivable being, possessing all great making properties [in every possible world]. Such a Maximally Great Being would be morally perfect because moral perfection is one of those great making properties it would necessarily have and possess. Since an "Evil God" would purportedly be both a morally imperfect AND a morally perfect being at the same time and in the same sense, it's a contradictory concept, and contradictions are impossible. Therefore, such a being cannot possibly exist. Just as a Square Circle cannot exist. At most, there could only be a very evil and very powerful being, but that being couldn't be "God" or an "Evil God" [i.e. "God" as defined in the Ontological Argument or Anselmian way]. Let's call such a finite being who is very evil [but not perfectly evil], very intelligent [but not omniscient or omnisapient] and very powerful [but not omnipotent] an Evil god [lower case "g"]. Or, better yet, Very Evil Greatly Empowered Spirit [VEGES]. Incidentally, three year olds inherently dislike VEGES. Especially green ones.

V. Rationally a Very Evil Spirit [i.e. VEGES] doesn't make much sense. From the atheistic proponents of the Evil God Hypothesis [EGH] I understand that such a being would perform both good and evil things in such a way to maximize suffering, but that we wouldn't be able to tell from the percentages of evil and good that the being was either good or evil. The main point of the EGH is to undermine the evidence for the existence of God based on all the good we DO see in the world. Craig has pointed out that theists don't at all (or don't merely IMO) conclude that God is good based on an inductive survey of the balance of good and evil in the world. There are other evidences and arguments that support the existence of God (e.g. the Moral Argument, the Contingency Argument, the Kalam Cosmological Argument et al.). A proponent of EGH could argue that every evidence and argument for God could appear plausible to us only because the Evil God/Spirit/Cartesian Demon tampers with our brains to make us think they are plausible or valid or even sound. Such a powerful being could be tricking us to think that 2 + 2 = 4, when in actuality [ad arguendo] 4 is the wrong answer. If that's the case, then all argument is moot, as Hays pointed out.

But assuming at least some of our observations and ratiocinations are reliable, then an Evil Spirit [VEGES] doesn't make much rational sense. Such a being would seem to more likely create an unpredictable cartoonish world than the world that we actually observe; which is intricately structured, uniform, elegant, mathematical, consistent and apparently designed and finely-tuned. When we consider all of the physical sciences [e.g. physics, cosmology, cosmogony, chemistry etc.], it seems to me to be clear that if there was a very powerful being who created the world we live in it would have to be EXTREMELY intelligent. Yet, what possible motivation could such a very intelligent and rational being have for maximizing the evil or calamity or suffering in the world? Wouldn't such a being have enough of an ego and self-esteem so as to challenge itself to create something wonderful rather than awful? Making awful things is easy. idiots can do it. But making/creating wonderful things is hard. Executing the latter would be better for its self-esteem than the former since its creation(s) would be a reflection of its own nature and character. That's consistent with a maximally great being, viz. God. Though, admittedly it's conceivable that a finite Evil Spirit [VEGES] might have low self-esteem and so wreaks havoc on its creatures like a disturbed child who burns insects using a magnifying glass. But such petty behavior would seem to be beneath the dignity of a highly intelligent finite being [much less a maximally great one]. This makes some sense even if the Spirit doesn't intend for us to know it or worship it. However, were such a being to exist, it's also the case that there are other rational conscious agents which it created that can evaluate its creation, namely us human beings. Wouldn't such a being want to impress us with its power and wisdom [cf. Rom. 1:19-20ff.] instead of the lack of power and wisdom? How much more if it does want us to worship it? IF it WOULD want us to worship it for its moral perfections even though it secretly knows its own evil behavior, that would seem to lead to its Cognitive Dissonance. Intelligence usually prefers consistency over inconsistency. The consistency and uniformity we see in the physical world would imply an internal rational, existential and psychological consistency on the part of the creator/Creator that argues against the VEGES favoring, creating, planning and enjoying pointless evil and suffering.

VI. If a VEGES existed, then it would (IMO) likely NOT make the evidence for one religion greater than that for others. Yet, from my (admittedly) limited inductive research (and that of others whose research I stand on), the case for Christianity is much stronger than for other worldviews. If the religions of the world were inspired by the VEGES to confuse mankind, then why providentially make Christianity have a better apologetical case for it than (most or [apparently via induction] all) other worldviews? If that's true, then that tips the scales away from an VEGES. For at least two reasons. 1. There's independent evidence for the truth of Christianity and its specific God, as Craig has pointed out. So, that tips the scales away from and equal 50/50 balance. 2. Given EGH/VEGES, it's unlikely that any one theistic worldview would have better credentials. It's true that one could argue that the EG/VEGES could have providentially created the Christian religion for it to be worshipped (along with the other religions). But that suffers from at least two problems. 1. The Cognitive Dissonance I mentioned above. 2. The numbers of people who worship the Christian God, while consistent with Calvinism, is not so consistent with a being that wants to (nearly?) maximize belief and devotion to it from its creatures. Though, in all honesty, and to play the VEGES advocate, this is not strictly illogical/inconsistent. Especially since such a being could have created multiple worlds/universes, some of which have entire civilizations that uniformly worship it, so that of all rational creatures in the entire multiverse, only a small percentage of them don't worship it in one similar form [a form that intersects all universes but that's also dishonest since it doesn't accurately represent its true nature and character]. Or, given all civilizations in all universes, on average, there is no singular worldview that has better credentials. However, WE only have this world/globe to do an inductive investigation, and IMO Christianity does stand out better than the rest. Logical possibilities which we have no evidence for shouldn't automatically trump inductive observations.
See my blogpost here on a related topic:
http://misclane.blogspot.com/2017/08/the-problem-of-evil-brief-conversation.html

VII. Finally, the existence of Evil, if acknowledged and granted as a premise, suggests or even requires an ultimate Good. The Moral Argument for God's Existence (argued by many theists like William Lane Craig) has as its corollary the inference that evil (and evils) actually proves the existence of God. Theists have argued that objective evil can only exist in contrast to an objective standard of Good/Goodness. Such a standard is more plausibly personal than impersonal [see video below]. Therefore, if objective evil exists and can only exist if God [the maximally great being] exists, then God exists. In which case NEITHER the Evil God [of the EGH] or the Very Evil Greatly Empowered Spirit exist [since God does exist], and their Hypotheses fail as a challenge to theism and (IMO) especially Christian Theism.

Is Atheistic Moral Platonism More Plausible Than Theism?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VGWAVRoLQ3c

See also my blogposts:

Evil God Challenge Revisited

God in Relation to Law: Ex Lex, Sub Lego or Sibi Ipsi Lex

Distinctions in God's Will from a Calvinist Perspective

Why Obey God?

The Problem of Evil, a Brief Conversation

The following is a brief conversation I had on Facebook with an atheist. I did minor editing and removed extraneous material. He posted the following quote and question:

MC²: "Wykstra backs off his 1984 claims (1984: 74, 79, 80, 90–91) that evil provides no evidence for atheism. He now calls those claims “reckless” (1996, 148 n. 14). He now admits that the evidence from evil, bracketing evidence for God's existence, “tilts” in favor (rather significantly, 1996, 138) of atheism, but not enough to justify belief in atheism, even if one starts from agnosticism."

Christian philosopher friends: do you agree or disagree with Wykstra? Does the evidence from evil tilt in favor of atheism over theism?

Before evil can be evidence for atheism, it must be shown that objective good and evil is coherent within atheism. The best hope for that is something like Atheistic Moral Platonism. However, I doubt it's coherent. See for example, William Lane Craig's simple critique here:
https://youtu.be/VGWAVRoLQ3c

Most modern apologetics & apolgists do acknowledge evil is evidence for atheism, *but* that the positive evidence for God tips the scale in favor of theism to a less or greater degree. Personally, I don't think evil is evidence against *Christianity* whatsoever, since part of the Christian worldview is to affirm the reality of sin and evil in the world. That God allows and directs them for His greater purposes. I say that as a Calvinist, but even historic Arminians, Catholics, Lutherans (etc.) would affirm God at least negatively permits evil for His greater purposes. The difference between Calvinists and most non-Calvinist versions of Christianity is whether God can in some sense positively ordain sin and evil.

Given that objective good and evil seem to be incompatible with atheism, AND given that there are various theistic options (like Christianity, Judaism, Islam et al.) that are (at least in principle) compatible with evil, evil would seem to not be very strong evidence (if at all) for atheism.

MC²: no, no, no.  It's neither here nor there if moral realism is impossible on atheism when it comes to the problem of evil. The problem only arises for someone who affirms that both evil and God exists. An atheist need only demonstrate that there is an internal inconsistency. And anyway, why think that moral realism is impossible on atheism anyway? Moral arguments are notoriously weak.

AP: The truth of atheism is distinct from any supposed insufficiency of the evidence for theism. I was referring to the non-existence of God, not the justification of the absence/lack of belief in God. Admittedly, the Problem of Evil for theism is a question of internal consistency. Since, there are various theistic options that are compatible with evil, it doesn't pose much trouble for theism, and therefore providing support for the truth of the non-existence of God. That's different from the psychological and rational question of whether one can be justified in being free of God/gods belief.

MC²: Well it does provide support for the truth of the nonexistence of God so...  Assuming by "God" we mean the Christian conception of God...

AP: Can you determine the percentages when it comes to how many conceptions of God are compatible with the existence of evil and how many aren't? There are potentially billions of rational civilizations in this universe, plus any other universe in a possible multiverse, plus whatever simulated worlds which have sentient personal agents. I certaintly can't make such a determination. I can only be aware of the theistic options on Earth that have survived history up to the present.

MC²: No, I can't. And..?

AP: Then it's possible that 99% of theistic options that have been conceived have been compatible with evil. In which case, wouldn't that suggest that evil doesn't pose much of a threat for theism?

MC²: Again so what? By "theism" I specifically mean 'belief in the sort of God Christians have in mind.' So what if my argument against theism doesn't say anything about other conceptions of God.  I'm still struggling to follow what you're even saying here

AP: Admittedly, I made that statement in terms of inductive possibility, not deductive possibility. When it comes to the deductive issue with regard to an an Omni-God, I still don't see any necessary incoherence.

MC²:  I'm not saying there is a logical incompatibility between God and evil existing simultaneously. I tend to prefer inductive or abductive arguments from evil myself.

AP: I corrected "an" to "any". If we were to define evil as anything contrary to a subset of God's will or preferences, those are consistent with other higher wills or preferences within God. Take a for example a voluntaristic conception of God (which I don't currently hold). If God were to will that eating chocolate ice cream were evil (CIC), while eating strawberry ice cream (SIC) is good, His omnipotent power isn't undermined if he allowed people to eat chocolate ice cream. Atheists can't automatically dismiss voluntaristic conceptions of God in favor of say essentialistic conceptions of God (I hold to Divine Command Essentialism).

AP: If I were an atheist I too would prefer inductive or (especially) abductive arguments since I think deductive arguments for atheism based on the PoE [problem of evil] utterly fail.

AP:  Inductive arguments of course must be much more modest because they depend on our finite inductive survey. Maybe of all the worlds God has created 99% of them have no evil, and the majority of the evil is concentrated on Earth. In which case, if we were privy to the percentages of good and evil in the entire Omniverse, we wouldn't find the existence of evil nearly as problematic as we do here on Earth.

AP:  Given the philosophical "Principle of plenitude" (i.e. God's infinite creativity), multiverses make a lot of sense. In which case, evil might be restricted to a tiny dark corner of the Omniverse.
[[For all we know the Omniverse is peopled with billions of various species all of whom are evil free and have the light of the knowledge of God in abundance.]]

Since the inductive/circumstantial argument for the non-existence of God based on gratuitous evil depends on percentages, and since we cannot gauge percentages given God's infinite creativity and the possible innumerable worlds He's created, we therefore cannot say that there is such a thing as gratuitous evil QUANTITATIVELY. So, the best avenue for atheists would seem to be to argue for evil's gratuity QUALITATIVELY. That is, on the basis of the intensity of the limited evil we are aware of. And that's where I think William Lane Craig's distinction between the 1. logical and 2. emotional problem of evil is so crucial. The suffering of a little child can be very emotionally troubling, but that's technically not a *logical* problem. God may have multiple present and future purposes for allowing that type of evil that we just cannot fathom in our finitude, but which make perfect sense in God's infinitude.

The Problem of Evil by William Lane Craig

There are numerous videos of varying length and intellectual depth on YouTube where William Lane Craig discusses the topic of the Problem of Evil and Suffering. I've provided below just two examples. One is a single lecture on the topic. The other is a series of lectures on the topic.

The Problem of Suffering & Evil | Worldview Apologetics Conference 2017

(https://youtu.be/Jp0Dtuu8seU)

Here are links to the nearly 3 1/2 hour long series of lectures by William Lane Craig on the Problem of Evil which he gave at Aalborg University in Denmark:

Part 1

https://youtu.be/4Q5zQC2BEVY

Part 2

https://youtu.be/vY7cjmm50jM

Part 3

https://youtu.be/Gd9hHo_H2rM

Part 4

https://youtu.be/IHPdjgv8chE

Is Calvinism Excusing Sinners and Blaming God? A Conversation with Dr. Guillaume Bignon

(posted 2018-03-05)

 https://youtu.be/YdhKfk47RmA

Is Calvinism Excusing Sinners and Blaming God?
A Conversation with Dr. Guillaume Bignon

Bignon was also interviewed in Dale Tuggy's Trinities podcast in two parts:

Part One Episode 216:
http://trinities.org/blog/podcast-216-bignons-defense-of-calvinism-part-1/

Part Two Episode 217:
http://trinities.org/blog/podcast-217-bignons-defense-of-calvinism-part-2/

See also Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Reformed Theology by Paul Manata

A response to Kevin Timpe’s objections [in his book review] by Guillaume Bignon

The Impassibility of God

The following are some interesting links that directly or indirectly deal with the doctrine of God's Impassibility. I have a few things to point out and say before I post the links.

 In one of his blogposts Steve Hays points out two different ways in which the doctrine of Impassibility is often defined. I recommend reading his blog on the topic. Here's an excerpt:

1. Classic theism teaches that God is impassible — not subject to suffering, pain, or the ebb and flow of involuntary passions. 

Incapable of suffering or of experiencing pain 

Incapable of feeling 

Compare that to a more academic definition of the term:

2. Nothing created can cause God to change or be modified in any way…Many classical theists make this point by insisting that God is impassible. In this context "Impassible"…means "not able to be causally modified by an external agent"…God cannot be altered by anything a creature does. B. Davies, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion (Oxford, 3rd ed, 2004), 5.

In the comments box I wrote:

I personally don't think that an affirmation of #2 entails an affirmation of #1.

It seems to me that an author of a book can be emotionally moved by the contemplation of the details of the drama within his book even though he himself choose to write it the way it is written. Analogously, maybe God can be emotionally effected by human tragedies which He Himself has ordained will come to pass. Especially if God's choosing the second order goods He purposes and plans might logically constrain Him to permit things that of themselves (per se) He disapproves of. For example, God ordains every sin we ever commit, yet we're called to not grieve or vex the Holy Spirit (Eph. 4:30; Isa. 63:10). Maybe not all the Scriptural data that speaks of God experiencing emotion is anthropopathic.

However, our experience of emotion is often tied to temporal consciousness, and therefore "emotion" (as we experience it) may not apply to God if He's timelessly eternal. But there might be something analogous to our experience of emotion that God experiences. Maybe more intensely than we do. At least that's what some Calvinists seem to believe (e.g. John Piper).

Then I quoted John Piper on God's Happiness which has implications for theodicy.

John Piper wrote:

It is not surprising, then, that Jonathan Edwards struggled earnestly and deeply with the problem that stands before us now. How can we affirm the happiness of God on the basis of His sovereignty when much of what God permits in the world is contrary to His own commands in Scripture? How can we say God is happy when there is so much sin and misery in the world?

Edwards did not claim to exhaust the mystery here. But he does help us find a possible  way of avoiding outright contradiction while being faithful to the Scriptures. To put it in my own words, he said that the infinite complexity of the divine mind is such that God  has the capacity to look at the world through two lenses. He can look through a narrow lens or through a wideangle lens.

When God looks at a painful or wicked event through His narrow lens, He sees the tragedy of the sin for what it is in itself, and He is angered and grieved: “I have no pleasure in the death of anyone, declares the Lord GOD” (Ezekiel 18:32).

But when God looks at a painful or wicked event through His wide-angle lens, He sees the tragedy of the sin in relation to everything leading up to it and everything flowing out from it. He sees it in relation to all the connections and effects that form a pattern, or mosaic, stretching into eternity. This mosaic in all its parts—good and evil—brings Him delight.5

- Desiring God: Meditations of a Christian Hedonist page 39


John Piper also wrote:

God's Happiness Is A Great Part Of His Glory

In 1 Timothy 1:11 Paul focuses on the gospel as "the glory of the blessed God." The word translated "blessed" in this phrase (makarivou) is the same one used in the beatitudes of Jesus in Matthew 5:3-11. "Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. Blessed are those who mourn, for they shall be comforted. Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth." And so on. The word means "happy" or "fortunate." Paul himself uses it in other places to refer to the happiness of the person whose sins are forgiven (Rom. 4:7) or the person whose conscience is clear (Rom. 14:22). It is astonishing that only here and in 1 Timothy 6:15 in the entire Old Testament and New Testament does the word refer to God. Paul has clearly done something unusual, calling God makarios, happy.

We may learn from the phrase "the glory of the happy God" that a great part of God's glory is his happiness. It was inconceivable to the apostle Paul that God could be denied infinite joy and still be all-glorious. To be infinitely glorious was to be infinitely happy. He used the phrase, "the glory of the happy God," because it is a glorious thing for God to be as happy as he is. God's glory consists much in the fact that he is happy beyond all our imagination.

- God is the Gospel page 100
God's impassibility, however one understands it should be seen in light of God's glory, sovereignty and wisdom.

Here are the external links:

http://www.rpcbmt.org/DivineImpassibility.html

http://www.mrrena.com/2004/suffer.php

http://www.rbap.net/journal-of-the-institute-of-reformed-baptist-studies-sample-of-impassibility-article/

http://www.spurgeon.org/~phil/articles/impassib.htm

http://paulhelmsdeep.blogspot.com/2014/03/eternal-god-and-god-in-time.html

http://paulhelmsdeep.blogspot.com/2013/09/god-both-impassible-and-impassioned.html


More Steve Hays blogs
http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2005/02/be-wary-of-ware-1.html
http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2005/02/be-wary-of-ware-2.html
http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2011/09/can-god-suffer.html
http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2014/02/still-impassible-confessing-god-without.html
http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2014/08/disambiguating-impassibility.html


P.S. The doctrine of God's Impassibility has once again come under scrutiny in Reformed Baptist circles. See for example this link HERE.


The Monergism website's list of articles on the doctrine of Impassibility:
https://www.monergism.com/topics/god%E2%80%99s-attributes/impassibility-god

William Lane Craig on Animal Suffering